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The Mexican Revolution left a p and 
destruction in its wake as it ravaged through the 
country. Caught up in the main stream of the turmoil, 
along with the poor wretched Mexicans, were hundreds 
of foreigners, symbolic of the policies initiated by 
the regime of Porfirio Diaz. Many aliens suffered 
immeasurably at the hands of rebels, Federales and 
peasants during the entire course of the Revolution, 
1910-1920. The purpose of this study is to examine 
some of these depredations. Chihuahua and Coahuila 
were singled out for the study because it was in 
Northern Mexico, and chiefly in these two states, that 
the intensity of revolutionary activity and foreign 
investment was best revealed. 
A number of works were consulted to put the compo­
nent parts of the Revolution, as they affected the 
degree to which foreigners were chastized, in their 
proper perspective. Material based exclusively on the 
depredations, their character and incidence, came 
chiefly from three main sources. The first of these 
were consular reports sent from American consuls in 
Mexico to the American State Department entitled. 
Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal 
Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1920^ The second source was 
the Fall Committee Report, Investigation of Mexican 
Affairs, which details some of the incidents based on 
the testimony of those involved. The third source used 
extensively to capture certain incidents was the New 
York Times from I9IO through I920. 
The Revolution had a tremendous impact on foreign 
investment in Chihuahua and Coahuila. Hundreds of 
foreign lives were lost and foreign financial losses 
were staggering. Seen as an obstacle in the Mexi­
cans* quest for the social, political and ecom)mic 
reforms that had been denied to them by the Diaz 
regime, the foreigner became a very expendable item. 
Director: Dr. Manuel A. Machado 
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PREFACE 
In the late 1800*s and into the first part of the 
1900*8 Mexico, with her abundant resources of oil and 
precious metals, was indeed a prize sought out by many 
foreign businessmen. The gringos from North of the bor­
der and other foreign entrepreneurs quickly capitalized 
on the concessions offered to them by Mexico's dictator, 
Porfirio D^az. Oil men, miners, ranchers and a host of 
other businessmen and workers moved into Mexico to lay 
claim to a huge portion of Mexico's wealth, wealth that 
Mexico would never completely recover. 
Diaz and the Centificos, his hand-picked intellec­
tual government workers, labored furiously in an attempt 
to attract foreign investors to Mexico. Supposedly, 
foreign investments would eliminate the problem of Mexico's 
sagging economy and thus, were courted at every opportun-
/ 
ity. To some degree, Mexico progressed during the Diaz 
regime, but the benefits of this progress never filtered 
down to the masses who sank farther into the quagmire of 
poverty. 
American investors rode with the tide of prosper-
ity as Diaz doled out land, oil, mine and railroad 
concessions to them. Their taxes, if any, amounted to 
V 
almost nothing and almost without fail, the American 
received preferential treatment over the Mexicans. Laws 
were passed to protect them and Mexicans caught harassing 
the Americans faced incarceration or, at times, death. 
For years the Mexican masses took a back seat to foreign­
ers, but because of the complete control exhibited by 
Diaz over the people, they had to endure the situation.i 
At the onset of the twentieth century the tight 
/ 
reign of Diaz began to lose its grip on the Mexican masses 
/ 
as opposition to Diaz began to come from diverse segments 
of the population. In 1905* the Flores Magon brothers, 
Jesus and Ricardo, initiated a movement among radical 
Mexican workers to completely destroy the Porfirian state 
and its economic system. The movement never amounted to 
much more than an irritant to Diaz, but the seeds for 
Revolution had been sown.^ 
/ 
When the aging Diaz, approaching senility, 
decided to run for re-election in the election of I910 
instead of stepping down as he had promised, revolution 
sprang from all quarters. Again, the economic system as 
well as Diaz became the target of the revolutionaries. 
^Ronald Atkin, Revolution! Mexico 1910-20,(New 
York« The John Day Company, 1969)» P* 22. 
^Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico, 
rev. ed., enl., originally published by Harvard University 
Press (New Yorki Atheneum, I97I), pp. 116-11?. 
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The disgriintled poor of Mexico, for years coiled to strike 
out at Diaz, became easy prey for Mexican caudillos seek­
ing to swell their ranks with new recruits for the 
struggle against the tyranny of the Porfiriato. 
Mexico exploded with revolution as the all out 
effort to destroy the Diaz regime intensified. Every-
/ 
thing and everyone connected with Porfirio Diaz was swept 
up in the swift current of revolution. Years of depriva­
tion had honed the revolutionary's blade into an instru­
ment of vicious destruction as the rebels marched through 
Mexico. 
Foreigners, too, symbolic of the Diaz practice of 
neglecting the Mexican masses while giving others innum­
erable benefits, suffered immensely at the hands of the 
/ 
rebels. During the initial revolt against Diaz smd then 
throughout the power struggle among the victors that 
followed, the peaceful haven that foreigners had known 
during the Porfiriato turned into a fiery hell. The 
purpose of this paper is to explain why this occurred and 
also to examine some of the hardships that befell foreign­
ers during the Mexican Revolution. 
The states of Chihuahua and Coahuila were singled 
out for this study because it was in these two states 
that revolutionary activity and personages abounded. Just 
as Christianity was born in Bethlehem and spread from 
vii 
there to encompass the whole world, the initial revolu­
tionary discontent seeds were nurtured in the northern 
Mexican states, mostly in Chihuahua and Coahuila, and 
from that focal point, emerged to eventually engulf all 
of Mexico. Throughout the Revolution, both states 
suffered almost constant warfare and destruction from 
contending factions. 
Many of the men synonymous with the Revolution 
were sons, either natural born or adopted, of Chihuahua 
or Coahuila. The long list includes four extremely 
important figures involved in the struggle, Pancho Villa, 
Venustiano Carranza, Pascual Orozco and Abraham Gonz^ez. 
All four contributed something to the long list of 
grievances exhibited by the foreign investors living in 
Chihuahua and Coahuila. Villa and Carranza, especially, 
found the number of investors there to their liking as 
they took sweet vengeance on Americans and foreigners 
whom they disliked. Another important factor and one 
very critical to this study revolves around the fact that 
these foreign investments outnumbered those in the other 
northern states of Sonora, Durango, Tamaulipas, or Nuevo 
Leon. 
For the study, a plethora of information was 
available relating generally to the political aspects of 
the Mexican Revolution. The two major sources used were 
viii 
Revolutioni Mexico 1910-20 by Ronald Atkin and Howard 
Cline*s The United States and Mexico. Atkin*s study is 
superb in style and content. Tracing the major happen­
ings of the Revolution and also discussing some important 
concepts that emerged from the struggle, the book is 
invaluable to the researcher who seeks out a good under­
standing of the Mexican Revolution. Cline*s work some­
times bogs down in detail, but one can not help but 
derive much knowledge from the study, all of which was 
very helpful. Other works that supplied some information 
on the Revolution in general were Lesley B. Simpson*s 
Many Mexicos and Mexico the Struggle For Modernity by 
Charles C. Cumberland. Simpson, like Atkin, provided 
important concepts as well as facts. 
A number of works furnished information about 
specific aspects of the struggle. Four books were 
especially helpful in the study of United States - Mexico 
relations. The first of these. The Mexican Revolution, 
1910-191^1 The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict by 
Peter Calvert points out clearly the problems created 
when the United States attempted to intervene in Mexican 
affairs during the turmoil. Clarence C. Clendenen in 
Blood on the Border The United States Army and The 
Mexican Irregulars describes the intense Mexican hatred 
of Americans that increased when the American Army 
ix 
entered Mexico in pursuit of the bandit Pancho Villa. 
Robert E. Quirk's book. An Affair of Honor» Woodrow 
Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz discusses how the 
American naval occupation of Veracruz was instrumental in 
toppling the Huerta government from power. Like Clenden-
en*s study. Quirk also focuses on the increased animosity 
shown toward Americans because of the occupation. Kenneth 
J. Grieb in The United States and Huerta examines in 
detail the controversy between Victoriano Huerta and 
American leaders. Reading Grieb, one is better able to 
understand why Huerta and Woodrow Wilson became so 
embittered toward each other. This mutual hatred had 
definite repercussions on Americans living in Mexico. 
During the Revolution, the relationship between 
England and Mexico was often as strained as that between 
the United States and Mexico. The Ph. D. Thesis of 
Raymond Carl Gerhardt, entitled "England and The Mexican 
Revolution 1910-1920*', superbly examined this topic. 
Gerhardt based his study on the numerous notes sent back 
and forth between the English Consuls in Mexico and the 
home government in England. 
Individual celebrities of the Revolution were 
aptly described by Charles Cumberland, Stanley R. Ross, 
/ / / / 
Martin Luis Guzman, Diego Rosado Lopez and Michael C. 
Meyer. Cumberland in Mexican Revolution Genesis Under 
Madero and Ross in Francisco I. Madero Apostle of Mexican 
X 
Democracy expertly traced in detail the events that 
brought Madero to the Presidency, the actions by others 
to replace him, and the inadequacies of the man to be 
President in the first place. Rosado Lo'pez work, 
Historia y Pensamiento Economico De M^ico; Comunica-
clones y Transportes Relaciones De Traba.jo presents the 
/ 
Mexican's attitude toward Diaz and his practice of neglect­
ing his own people and rewarding the foreigner. The 
/ 
malice held by Mexicans toward Diaz is very evident in 
/ ^ / 
Rosado Lopez* study. Martin Luis Guzman deals with the 
infamous patriot and bandit, Pancho Villa. Guzman's 
work. Memoirs of Pancho Villa gives the reader an 
insight into the life of Villa and some justification for 
Villa's actions before, during, and after the Revolution. 
The last of the five authors to deal with individuals, 
Michael C. Meyer, contributed two substantial works. In 
the first of these, Mexican Rebel Pascual Orozco and the 
Mexican Revolution 1910-1915» Meyer delves into the 
transition made by Orozco from muleteer to revolutionary. 
Orozco's role in the Revolution, especially his relation­
ships with Francisco Madero and Pancho Villa, is thoroughly 
covered. Meyer's second biography, Huerta A Political 
Portrait, focuses mainly on the period of Huerta*s presi­
dency, February, 1913» to July, 1914. Meyer contends 
that Huerta was not the counter-revolutionary portrayed 
by so many other writers, but was instead dedicated simply 
xi 
to the moderation of the new energies promulgated by the 
violent upheaval which began in I910. It is a refreshing 
look at a man, so often chastized by everyone. 
The best accounts used to localize the Revolution 
to just Chihuahua were Francisco R. Almada*s La Revolucion 
En El Estado de Chihuahua Tomo II and Florence C. and 
Robert H. Lister's Chihuahua Storehouse of Arms. Both 
works depicted, in great detail, many different stages of 
the Revolution throughout the state as it progressed from 
initial sporatic rebellions to full scale turmoil. 
The pre-Revolutionary status of some Mexican 
industries, especially those owned by foreigners, and the 
Revolution's impact upon those industries is best described 
in Rails, Mines, and Progress; Seven American Promoters in 
Mexico, 1867^1911 written by David M. Pletcher and in 
Marvin D. Bernstein's The Mexican Mining Industry I890-
1950 A Study of the Interaction of Politics, Economics, 
and Technology. Pletcher concentrates his efforts on the 
reasons why the promoters went to Mexico and the type of 
enterprises they initiated there. Bernstein's study 
describes the Mexican mining industry completely and pays 
special attention to the different types of taxes imposed 
upon the mine owners by the Mexican Government. The 
Constitution of I917 and its effect on foreigners is 
also very carefully analyzed by Bernstein. 
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Whereas a large variety of sources could be 
readily utilized when dealing strictly with the political 
aspects of the Revolution, quite the opposite was true 
with the availability of sources relating to the Revolu­
tion's impact on foreign investors. Since the study was 
limited just to the states of Chihuahua and Coahuila, the 
lack of available sources was very pronounced. Most 
American works consulted handled the topic on a national 
scale, if handled at all, and the Mexican studies, with 
very few exceptions, shyed away from the topic almost 
completely. Some help was found in Raymond Gerhardt's 
dissertation and in Bernstein's book about the Mexican 
mining industry, but Tulitas Jamieson offered much more 
aid in her book, Tulitas of Torreoni Reminiscences of 
Life in Mexico. The work vividly details some of the 
vicious atrocities committed against foreigners, mostly 
the Chinese, by various rebels and Federales in Torreon 
during the course of the Revolution. 
The futile search for quality material based on 
a regional approach to the Revolution caused much heart­
ache. The author was not able to be as discriminating 
as desired about some material because of the shortage 
of available sources. There is a tremendous need to 
investigate the Revolution through a regional approach. 
Far too often, historians have attacked the struggle 
from a "big picture of Mexico" angle. A much better 
xiii 
understanding of the total picture could be obtained by 
analyzing the revolutionary movements on a regional or 
better yet, a local basis. All regions of Mexico were 
not equally affected by the Revolution. Some saw 
virtually no violence while others, like Northern Mexico, 
were caked in blood. The presence in the North of most 
of the powerful personalities of the Revolution should, 
in itself, demand a thorough study of this region. To 
group all regions of Mexico together in one synonymous 
category is absurd whether one talks about the pre-Revo-
lution period, post-Revolution period or the Revolution 
itself. To know the whole of Mexico, one must study its 
diverse parts. Lesley Byrd Simpson captures my senti­
ments best by speaking of the "Many Mexicos" to be found 
south of the border. Hopefully, other researchers will 
bend their efforts in this direction as did William H. 
Beezley in Insurgent Governor. Beezley*s study centers 
around Abraham Gonza'lez, Governor of Chihuahua, and the 
fact that numerous events in Chihuahua epitomized the 
Revolution. Beezley contends that the failure of Madero 
to formulate a national program capable of securing 
revolutionary goals forced the necessary political action 
to come at the state level. Chief among the leaders of 
this action was Abraham Gonzai.ez in Chihuahua. 
The lack of material relating directly to the 
topic forced the writer to extensively utilize three 
xiv 
major sources. The first of these. The New York Times, 
offered extensive accounts of Revolutionary events 
especially when it involved danger to life or limb of 
foreigners. Also, any time American property was 
threatened, the paper quickly picked up the story. 
Another fine source that deals almost exclusively 
with the problems faced by foreigners during the Revolu­
tion is the Fall Committee Report that came out of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations entitled Investiga­
tion of Mexican Affairs. This two volume report consists 
mostly of testimonies offered by the people, or their 
friends or relatives, who were victimized in Mexico 
during the Revolution. Many interesting and informative 
statistics also are found in the report which was compiled 
at Senate hearings held in various United States cities. 
The third major source, and easily the most often 
used, was the microform reproduction entitled Records of 
the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of 
Mexico, 1910-1929* In the microfilm, the course of many 
of the events that occurred during this period is traced 
by messages sent back and forth by consuls and American 
businessmen in Mexico to the American State Department. 
The Americaji Consuls in Mexico quite often had their 
finger on the pulse of the Revolution and were quick to 
send any information, especially when it concerned Ameri­
cans, on to Washington. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Mexican Revolution of I9IO caused immeasurable 
damage to Mexico. The turmoil constantly subjected her 
people to vicious cruelties and hardships and her coun­
tryside became devastated almost beyond repair. But, the 
Mexican people did not suffer alone, because foreigners, 
mostly American, Spanish and Chinese, also suffered from 
atrocities committed against them by Mexican rebels, 
bandits, Federales and peasants. To understand why for­
eigners received such harsh treatment during the Revolu­
tion it is necessary to know why Mexicans of all classes 
cultivated a deep hatred for them even before the 
Revolution begsm. It is also of extreme importance to 
become familiar with the events of the Revolution because 
they significantly affected the degree to which foreigners 
became chastised at the hands of the Mexican people. 
To the student of Mexican history, the granting 
of concessions to foreigners enabling them to exploit the 
riches of Mexico is synonymous with the dictatorship of 
Porfirio Diaz (I876-I9II) because during his regime the 
/ / 
cientificos, Diaz* intellectual administrators, fashioned 
1 
2 
the economic policies of Mexico that granted a large role 
to foreign capital. To finance the future of Mexico, 
these advisors, convinced that the country lacked enough 
liquid capital to implement their economic programs, 
turned to other countries to obtain the needed money. 
They hoped that this foreign capital would mix with avail­
able local resources and eventually create, by the multi­
plier principle, an ever increasing storehouse of funds. 
These funds then would eventually be large enough to force 
out the foreign investments.^ 
/ 
The Diaz administration labored strenuously to 
attract foreign capital. The offer of excellent returns 
on their capital outlay, cheap land, rich oil deposits, 
innumerable mines, and cheap labor enticed many foreigners 
to invest in Mexico and once the newcomer entered the 
country, he was treated with the hospitality due to any 
invited guest. 
The mining industry especially appealed to foreign 
investors because the government changed the Mexican 
mining laws to conform to the concepts and practices to 
which foreigners were accustomed.^ Mexican laborers 
could be hired for as little as one to three pesos per 
^Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 5^* 
^Atkin, Revolution! Mexico 1910-20, p. 22, 
3 
/ 
day and the Diaz administration guaranteed that this labor 
would remain docile by making strikes illegal. The three 
pesos per day wage earned by the Mexican laborer appeared 
extremely cheap compared to the five dollars per day that 
foreign mine owners paid their fellow nationals.3 
Construction of railroads during the Porfiriato 
also depended to a large degree on foreign money. For­
eign concerns flocked to Mexico, taking advanta^^e of the 
/ 
concessions and other favors granted to them by the Diaz 
administration. Utilizing European capital as well as 
that from the United States, Canada, and Mexico, the rail­
road system grew from less than 700 miles of track in 
1880 to more than 12,000 miles by I9IO. Although a series 
of consolidations brought approximately 60 per cent of 
the lines under government ownership, many of the rail­
roads still remained under foreign ownership.^ 
With the discovery of oil along the Gulf coast 
at the end of the Nineteenth centruy a third sector of 
Mexico's national economy became a much sought-after 
3 
^Marvin D. Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry 
1890-1950 A Study of the InteraciiTon of Politics, Eco-
nomics, and Techology (New York: State University of New 
York, 196^), pp. 8^-91; Atkin, Revolution!, p. 156. After 
the first two years of the Revolution the peso had stabil­
ized to a parity of forty-nine and a half American cents. 
k 
Charles C. Cumberland, Mexico the Struggle For 
Modernity (London, Oxford, New York': Oxford University 
Press, 1968), pp. 21^-217. 
prize for foreign investors. Two men in particular, 
Edward L. Doheny, an American, and Weetman Pearson, an 
Englishman, realized tremendous profits from the conces-
Z' c; 
sions granted to them by the Diaz regime.^ 
Foreigners involved in mining, railroads and oil 
were joined by other aliens interested in ranching and 
business opportunities. Throughout Mexico, foreign 
ranchers and farmers took advantage of the cheap prices 
to purchase large tracts of land while foreign business­
men opened up concerns of all types in the cities. Mex-
/ 
ico became a haven for foreigners as the Diaz regime 
constantly favored them in legal disputes with Mexicans. 
The government completely neglected Mexicans in all 
walks of life while lavishing the foreigners with first 
class treatment. Depiction of this inequality can be 
found in the illustration that many foreign companies, 
besides paying much higher wages to their own national 
employees, provided them with lodging that had lights, 
water and ice, but did not have to furnish the same items 
to Mexican workers.^ 
With the aid of foreign capital the long dicta-
^Atkin, Revolution!, p. 19-
^Atkin, Revolution;,,p. 22; Di^go G. Lopez Rosado, 
Historia y Pensamiento Economico De Mexico Comunicaciones 
Transporjjbes Relaciones De Trabajo (Universidad Nacional 
Autonomia de McTxico, 1969), p. 357* 
5 
/ 
torial rule of Porfirio Diaz brought many surface improve­
ments to Mexico, "but in spite of this, the methods he 
used to bring about progress bred embryonic discontent 
7 
among Mexicans. Utilizing the slogan of pan £ palo 
Di'az rewarded those who supported him and punished those 
who did not. Literally speaking, pan o palo meant "Bread 
or stick" and the opposition often received the stick in 
a brutal manner. By controlling the caciques or local 
leaders, and sometimes rewarding them with a governorship, 
Diaz secured control of all levels of government from the 
8 
national on down to the local arena. 
/ 
With the insured support of Diaz, foreigners began 
to export much of Mexico's wealth for their own profit. 
The riches of Mexico flowed in a continuous stream out 
of the country because many foreigners initially did not 
pay any taxes. While many aliens capitalized on the 
wealth of Mexico, only a very limited few Mexicans 
realized any monetary profits. Foreigners sent capital 
to Mexico and this only strengthened the rule of a 
dictator who absolutely failed to spread the benefits 
Vol. 2 (Fondo be Cultura Econdmica, 1955)* p« 22. 
6 
/ 
derived from this capital evenly among his people. Diaz 
had done much to develop his country, but because he had 
completely neglected the bulk of his people, his rule 
would no longer be endured. To one American mine owner 
/ 
in Mexico, Diaz appeared to be the greatest man in North 
America because he had made property "twenty times safer 
in Mexico than it is in the United States". But, to the 
miserable peon who had lost his land and his livelihood 
/ 
to foreign intruders because of Diaz* policies, the dic­
tator of Mexico symbolized something evil which should be 
9 
exterminated. 
/ 
Early signs of popular discontent with Diaz* 
administration surfaced as early as I900 when an anarchist 
/ 
group led by two brothers, Ricardo and Jesus Flores 
Magon, published a newspaper, Regeneracio^, in Mexico 
City. The radical group organized a chain of clubs and 
began to criticize the Church and conservative groups, 
/ 
but before long, they began to attack Porfirio Diaz him­
self.^® In late I903 the brothers fled to the United 
States to organize an attempt to overthrow the dictator­
ship. Constantly on the move because of persecution by 
^Atkin, Revolution!, p. 22; David M. Fletcher, 
Rails, Mines and Progress 1 Seven American Promoters in 
Mexico, 1867-1911 (Ithica, New Yorkt~"Cornell University 
Press, 1958)» p. 309 and p. 216. 
^'^Pletcher, Rails, Mines and Progress, pp. 236-
23?. 
7 
agents of the Mexican government, they organized the 
Jiinta of the Mexican Liberal Party in St. Louis during 
September of 1905* The platform of the Liberal party, 
published in July, I906, called for political, economic 
and social reforms and above all, the removal of Diaz. 
Circulating propaganda throughout Mexico, the party 
became popular among industrial workers, helped to organ­
ize the workers, and also provided leadership for strikes. 
Their activities revolved around the preparation for 
11 
armed rebellion against Diaz. 
In 1906 laborers, urged on by the Partido Liberal 
Mexicano (Mexican Liberal Party), began demanding better 
wages and better working conditions. A series of strikes 
resulted when employers refused their demands. In Cananea, 
Sonora, a strike involving 2,000 disgruntled miners took 
place on June 1. Violence erupted when the office per­
sonnel, most of whom were Americans, fired upon the 
strikers. No one suffered injury, but the strikers, 
embittered by the shooting, embarked on a rampage of riot 
and destruction. The imposition of martial control 
finally ended the disturbance, but not until after twenty 
men had died. The strikers, although forced to go back 
to work under the same conditions as before the strike, 
1 1 
Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero Apostle 
of Mexican Democracy (New Yorkj Columbia University 
Press, 1955)» pp. 41-42. 
8 
still had influenced other laborers to strike in the 
ensuing months.^^ 
On January 7, 190?, workers at the Rio Blanco 
sugar mill in Veracruz rioted after they refused to 
/ 
accept a judgement handed down by Diaz in his role as 
arbiter between the workers and their employers. The 
judgement supported the employers' position on almost 
every demand made by the workers. Diaz sent in Federal 
troops to quell the riot and they broke the strike by 
killing many of the men in the streets and by later 
executing 200 more. This brutal act ended the strikes, 
but discontent still existed in the labor class. Con-
y 
vinced that Diaz was completely under the influence of 
the industrialists, labor reluctantly had to wait for 
reforms.^^ 
/ 
Diaz had failed the laborers and he also neglected 
the Indian masses. Forced in many cases to pay excessive 
taxes on his land, the Indian also fell victim to the 
y 
graft involved in the Diaz administration. Corrupt 
government officials often sold Indian village lands to 
companies or to a single individual even though the 
government had scheduled the land to be parceled out to 
individuals. The poor Indian, often left without the 
12 
Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, pp. 16-18. 
13 
•'^Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, pp. 18-21. 
9 
means to support himself and his family, frequently had 
to work for a wealthy land owner who often treated him 
as harshly as a slave. Bound to the haciendas by debt 
peonage, the Indian had no recourse to justice because 
his pleas fell on deaf ears in the Diaz administration. 
The Indian and the industrial laborer, understandably, 
harbored violenty anti-Diaz sentiments. Seeds of dis-
y 
content definitely sown by Diaz* policies soon would 
germinate into rebellion. 
/ 
Although Diaz put down small insurrectos through­
out the country, political unrest grew markedly between 
/ 
1907 and 1909. In I908, Diaz granted an interview to 
James Creelman, an American writer from Pearson's Maga-
zine. In the interview Diaz announced that he would not 
run for office again in the election of I9IO. He also 
stated that Mexico was definitely on the road to progress 
and that the time had arrived for him to welcome the 
formation of opposition parties. The story broke in 
Pearson's in February, and by March 3» 1908, M Imparcial, 
the daily newspaper, published a translation in Mexico. 
y 
To those repressed by the Diaz regime for so long, this 
news offered a glitter of hope. Mexico teemed with 
enthusiasm and political activity as the growing opposi-
^^Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, pp. 21-24. 
10 
/ 
tion sought out a leader to replace Diaz. However, on 
May 30» Di^z performed an about face and announced that 
Mexico needed him and he would therefore be a candidate 
/ 
again. But, Diaz had waited too long to suppress the 
increasing opposition. Anti-reelection clubs formed 
everywhere and agitation for a change in government grew 
extremely fast. As the anti-reelection movement spread, 
most of the participants threw their support behind the 
growing presidential candidacy of Francisco I. Madero. 
Madero had come to the foreground of Mexican politics in 
1908 when he wrote a book entitled The Presidential 
Succession in 1910. The book exposed some of the evils 
of the Diaz system and the enemies of Diaz utilized the 
work as a manifesto to express their own ideals. Firmly 
convinced that the cure to Mexico's political ills lay 
in freedom of elections, Madero*s political slogan became 
"Effective Suffrage And No Reelection. 
As more and more people read the book, the name 
of Madero became known. In June, 1909, Madero embarked 
on a speaJcing tour of Mexico and received tremendous 
y 
response. Initially, Diaz paid scant attention to the 
Maderista movement, but as Madero's popularity increased. 
Atkin, Revolution!, pp. k2-kjt Florence C. and 
Robert H. Lister, Chihuahua Storehouse of Arms (The Uni­
versity of New Mexico Press, 1966), p. 210; and Ross, 
Madero, pp. 44-45. 
11 
/ 
Diaz took steps to suppress him. Finally in June, 1910, 
/ 
Diaz incarcerated Madero until the election of June 26 
had safely passed. On July 20, Diaz released Madero on 
bail in the tovm of San Luis Potosi and on October 6, 
the rebel fled to Texas, convinced now that the only way 
to remove Diaz was by force. 
Up until this time Madero found the thought of 
armed rebellion abhorrent, but the circumstances forced 
him to initiate his own insurrection and in November 
he issued his political manifesto from San Antonio, but 
he backdated it to October 5» 1910, to avoid the possibil­
ity of the United States being blamed for harbouring and 
encouraging a rebellion. In the manifesto, called The 
Plan of San Luis Potosi, Madero told the Mexican people 
that he knew they were anxious for liberty sind determined 
to reestablish a constitutional regime. He reiterated 
how Diaz had violated their individual rights and caused 
them unbearable suffering from hunger while he labored 
only to enrich his supporters and foreign investors. 
Also, the plan voided the recent Mexican elections and 
named Madero as provisional president. Madero promised 
that when his forces triumphed there would be a free 
presidential election and a revision of all the laws 
and decrees adopted during the Porfiriato. Copies of 
the plan circulated throughout the country and November 
20, 1910, emerged as the starting date for the upcoming 
12 
16 
revolution. 
Revolutionary rumblings permeated the political 
scene in Mexico after the distribution of Madero's plan. 
In Chihuahua, initial preparations for November 20 matured 
under the guidance of members of the anti-reelection 
clubs as they scoured the country side recruiting all the 
/ 
anti-Diaz elements. Two of the recruits they found 
would later play significant roles in the Revolution. 
They were Pascual Orozco, Jr., and Francisco "Pancho" 
Villa. 
Pascual Orozco, influenced by the anti-government 
literature of the Flores Magon brothers as early as 1906, 
had completely dedicated himself to the anti-reelection-
ist cause by 1910. Pancho Villa, like Orozco, came into 
the rebel camp because of the recruiting efforts of 
Abraham Gonzalez, one of the leading anti-reelectionists 
in C h ihuahua.Villa joined t he anti-reelectionist move-
/ 
ment not just because the Diaz regime had branded him an 
outlaw but also because of his love for Francisco Madero. 
/ 
Madero's unshakable faith in The Plan of San Luis Potosi 
16 
Atkin, Revolution!, pp. 46-49; Fuentes para la 
historia d.e la revolucion Mexicana, Vol. 4 (Fondo De Cul-
tura Economica, 1957), P* 141; and Atkin, Revolution!, 
p. 49. 
17 
Lister and Lister, Chihuahua, p. 211; Michael C. 
Meyer, Mexican Rebel Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revo­
lution I9IO-I915 (Lincoln{ University of Nebraska Press, 
1967), p. 17; and Atkin, Revolution!, p. 52. 
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and his devotion to the struggle of Mexico's poor and 
oppressed, even though he lived a life of luxury, com­
pletely won over Villa's affection. Villa enthusiasti­
cally accepted the rank of captain and rode into the 
mountains in search of more men while Gonz^ez commis­
sioned Orozco as Commander of the Guerrero District.^® 
Maderistas eagerly awaited the starting date of 
the Revolution. However, the uprising seemed destined 
not to wait until November 20 to begin when, on November 
5, an angry mob demonstrated in front of the American 
consulate in Chihuahua City. The mob sought revenge for 
a fellow Mexican, burned at the stake in Texas for 
killing an American woman. They hurled bottles and 
insults at the consulate and even though the Federales 
quickly dispersed the crowd, anti-American feelings 
persisted. 
Anti-American hostility became increasingly pre­
valent throughout the Republic toward the end of 1910. 
The United States Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, 
attributed this phenomenon to the memories that still 
18 / 
Martin Luis Guzman, Memoirs of Pancho Villa, 
translated by Virginia Taylor (Austini University of 
Texas Press, I965), p./21; William H. Beezley, Insurgent 
Governor Abr^am Gonzalez and the Mexican Revolution in 
Chihuahua (Lincoln? University of Nebraska Press, 1973)» 
pp. 36-37* 
^^Lister and Lister, Chihuahua, p. 212. 
existed from the War of 1846, race antipathy, but mostly 
to the resentment of American commercial aggression. 
Through the collusion of officials and the courts and by 
presenting fraudulent or outlawed titles, corrupt 
officials began to confiscate American estates. Through­
out Mexico, Americans saw their personal rights constantly 
OA 
abused, often without due process of law.'*" 
The Revolution began in earnest almost a week 
ahead of schedule when villagers in the town of Cuchillo 
Parado battled with Diaz* rurales. Three days later 
Pancho Villa and his band struck at San Andres, killed 
/ 
the mayordomo of the Hacienda de Chavarria, and moved 
into the house and the outbuildings. Pascual Orozco and 
his followers marched on the Federal headquarters at 
Guerrero on the twentieth and other localities throughout 
the state also came under fire by rebels. Initial Mader-
ista victories inspired the rebels, but the Diaz forces 
regrouped and quickly dealt the insurrectos a series of 
defeats. It appeared as if the Revolution would fail. 
Madero, himself, abandoned his entry into Mexico and 
returned to San Antonio. However, the Maderistas in 
20 
Henry Lane Wilson to Philander C. Knox, 31 Octo­
ber 1910, Records of the Department of State Relating to 
Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929 (State Department 
Piles of the National Archives, Record Group 59» M-274, 
812.00/355)• Unless otherwise indicated all correspon­
dence of the Department of State will be from the 812.00 
files and will be identified only by the slash number. 
15 
Chihuahua would not allow the spark of revolution to die. 
Led chiefly by Orozeo, the rebels fought on, with moderate 
success, into the early months of I9II. Madero finally 
entered Mexico in February to direct the campaign and the 
movement gained more momentum. By April, the flame of 
rebellion roared in Mexico as diverse rebel groups, 
/ 
other than the Maderistas, all lashed out at Diaz. On 
May 10, the Maderistas captured the important city of 
Ciudad Juarez. This victory signaled the end of the Diaz 
regime as Mexicans everywhere, sensing the end was near, 
joined the rebel cause. 
/ 
At first, Diaz refused to accept the inevitable, 
but on May 25, 1911» he wrote out his resignation. An 
/ . / 
agreement reached between Jose Ives Limantour, Diaz* 
Minister of Finance, and agents representing Madero called 
for the installation of a provisional government. The 
terms of the agreement named Francisco Leon de la Barra, 
Mexican Ambassador to the United States, to act as interim 
President until Madero could be legally elected in Octo­
ber of 1911.22 
The interim presidency of de la Barra faced imme-
21 
Lister and Lister, Chihuahua, p. 213; Ross, 
Madero, pp. 126-12?; and pp. I3I-I66. 
22 
Lesley Byrd Simpson, Many Mexicos, rev. ed. 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1 University of California 
Press, 1971)» pp. 296-297. 
l6 
diate problems as diverse elements throughout Mexico 
made demands that the platform and policies of Madero 
could not meet. The Mexican people wanted their share of 
the Revolution and they wanted it immediately. Emiliano 
Zapata, the leader of the agrarian forces in the state of 
Morelos who fought so hard against Diaz, adamantly 
demanded immediate land reforms. The demands placed de 
la Barra in a helpless position as his administration 
did not have the means to please everyone at once. Madero 
found himself in a precarious position because the people 
made demands on his platform, but he had not yet been 
elected. 
By the time Madero assumed the presidency on 
November 6, I9II, his prestige and popularity had dimin­
ished. Continuous turmoil throughout the Republic and a 
divided party added still more woe to Madero's plight. 
Madero could not handle the situation. Since he chose 
to rule with sweetness and brotherly love instead of a 
firm hand, self-seeking politicians permeated his admin­
istration and Mexico again became victimized by an 
/ 
administration as corrupt as that of Diaz, but without 
^^Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolution^ 1910-191^ 
The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict (Cambridge» 
at The University^ress, I968), pp. 86-89; Berta Ulloa, 
"Las Relaciones Mexico - norteamericanas I9IO-I9II", 
Historia Mexicana, July - September 1965* Vol. XV, no. 
1, p. 26. 
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the stability of the Porfiriato. By mid 1912, Orozco, 
Zapata, and other caudillos revolted and the weak Madero 
24 
could not stop them. 
Mexico exploded again with strife as general 
strikes of mine, peon, ranch, and farm laborers forced 
many concerns, foreign and Mexican, to close down. The 
perilous conditions prompted the United States State 
Department to authorize Henry Lane Wilson to hand out 
arms to Americans in Mexico for their own protection. 
For fifteen months Madero struggled as President, 
failing to bring peace to Mexico. On February 18, 1913, 
a coup led by General Victoriano Huerta removed Madero 
and shot him to death four days later. Of striking 
importance to this coup is the fact that Henry Lane 
/ 
Wilson worked with Huerta and General Felix Diaz in draw­
ing up an agreement naming Huerta as provisional presi-
y 
dent. The agreement allowed Diaz, who also had revolted 
against Madero, to campaign for the presidency later. 
Wilson also added to anti-American sentiment when he 
refused to intervene to save Madero*s life.^^ 
The brutal killing of Madero by Huerta almost 
Simpson, Many Mexicos, pp. 298-299. 
^•^Luther T. Ellsworth to Philander C. Knox, 
15 December 1911, /2638; Ellsworth to Knox, 1 April 
1912, /35II. 
^^Atkin, Revolution!, pp. 118-122. 
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immediately fermented new revolts by Madero sjmipathizers. 
Venustiano Carranza, Governor of Coahuila, rebelled and 
began fighting on March 1. Carranza, posing as the 
defender of Madero in order to rally supporters in the 
United States and Mexico, officially announced his revo­
lutionary position in the Plan of Guadalupe on March 26. 
The plan disavowed Huerta as President of the Republic 
and conferred upon Carranza the title of First Chief of 
the Constitutionalist Army with the power to make war on 
the Huertista regime. Carranza quickly received support 
from Alvaro Obrego'n of Sonora, a veteran soldier in the 
fight against Pascual Orozco's revolt. The movement 
picked up added strength at the end of March when Pancho 
Villa initiated a formidable anti-Huerta campaign and 
when Emiliano Zapata cast his lot with the anti-Huerta 
elements. With the addition of Zapata the rebels marched 
on the capital from two sides, the North and the South. 
Besides the growing strength of the opposition 
in Mexico, Huerta faced the hostility of the American 
government. President Woodrow Wilson, extremely distressed 
by the killing of Madero, refused to recognize as legit­
imate the Huerta regime. The failure of Huerta to gain 
27 
Kenneth J. Grieb, The United States and Huerta 
(LincolnJ University of Nebrask^ Press, I969), pp. 34-35} 
Francisco R. Almada, La Reyolucion En El Estado de Chihua­
hua Tomo II (Chihuahua, 1964), p. 30> and Meyer, Mexican 
Rebel, pp. 96-IOI, 
19 
this recognition brought many hardships to his administra­
tion because Wilson permitted United States arms to be 
shipped to the Carranza forces and constantly sought some 
excuse to intervene in Mexico to depose Huerta. Wilson 
became obsessed with the idea of deposing Huerta, whom 
he pictured as the symbol of everything wrong with Latin 
America. Huerta*s plan to pacify the country and then to 
request United States recognition, based on this accom­
plishment, fell on deaf ears in Washington. 
As 1913 drew to a close the Constitutionalists 
looked invincible, but in 191^, Huerta suspended payments 
on national bonds and used this money to enlarge his 
army and to purchase more arms and ammunition. Military 
successes now came to the Federal forces and the anti-
Huerta movement suffered a number of set-backs. To add 
further woes to their plight, a dispute arose between 
Villa and Carran2,a which racked the Constitutionalist 
forces with dissension. 
As 191^ progressed, neither side appeared to hold 
a distinct edge in the struggle. Then a key victory by 
Villa at the important rail center of Torreon gave the 
Constitutionalists the advantage. Villa's victory opened 
the way directly to the capital, but even more important 
^®Ross, Madero, pp. 336-337; Michael C. Meyer, 
Huerta A Political Portrait (Lincoln; University of 
Nebraska Press, 1972), pp. 111-112. 
20 
it indirectly provided the opportunity for Woodrow Wilson 
to intervene. 
After Villa took Torreon, the center of fighting 
shifted to the strategic oil producing areas around Tam-
pico. Many American nationals, protected by the United 
States navy vessels at Veracruz and Tampico, lived in the 
area. When Huerta arrested some American sailors load­
ing gasoline at Tampico, a major incident developed. The 
Federales released the sailors with apologies by the 
Mexican commandant, but Admiral Henry T. Mayo, in charge 
of the naval forces in the area wanted a twenty-one gun 
salute as an apology because he felt that the United 
States flag had been insulted. Huerta would not comply 
with this demand and Wilson, informed of the impending 
arrival of a shipload of German arms sent to Huerta at 
Veracruz, ordered Admiral Frank F. Fletcher to occupy 
that port in retaliation to Huerta*s refusal to uphold 
the honor of the United States. The taking of Veracruz 
cut off the supplies and revenues needed to sustain the 
Huerta regime and less than three months later, on July 
17» 191^» the defeated Huerta sailed into exile,30 
29 
Cline, U.S. and Mexico, pp. 15^-155• 
30 
Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor Woodrow 
Wilson and the Occupation o7 Veracruz (University of 
Kentucky Press, 1962), pp. 5-8; Simpson, Many Mexicos, 
p» 3035 and Atkin, Revolution!, p. 208. 
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After Huerta*s defeat, a struggle raged between 
Villa and Carranza for control of Mexico. Mexico City-
wallowed in a state of confusion because it had to endure 
so many changes of government. Villa would occupy the 
capital for awhile then be dispersed by the Carranza 
forces, who in turn would retreat on Villa's return. The 
bitter struggle continued until April, 1915» when Obregon, 
who remained loyal to Carranza, soundly defeated Villa 
at Celaya in one of the bloodiest battles of the civil 
war.^^ 
Woodrow Wilson took extreme measures after the 
battle of Celaya. Waiting to see who would emerge as 
the victor before recognizing any of the participants, 
he literally destroyed Villa when he cut off his supply 
of arms and backed Carranza. Villa retaliated by attack­
ing Americans in Mexico and by leading raids against 
Americans in the United States. In March, 1916, Villa 
raided Columbus, New Mexico and Wilson sent General John 
J. Pershing into Mexico to catch him. Reduced to the 
status of a bandit. Villa made life miserable for 
32 
foreigners in Mexico. 
By 1916, the Carranza government began to show 
signs of stability, but because he refused to take advice 
^^Simpson, Many Mexicos, pp. 304-305. 
32 
Simpson, Many Mexicos, p. 305* 
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from his staff, many of his best men deserted him. In 
December, they forced him to call a constitutional con­
vention at Quere'taro and out of this convention emerged 
the present constitution of Mexico, the Constitution of 
1917. The new constitution, characterized by national­
istic motifs and embodied with the needed legal machinery, 
endeavored to end foreign economic rule in Mexico. It 
was also designed to alleviate the social and economic 
inequities of the people, a revolutionary goal.33 
The convention dealt a severe blow to Carranza. 
Emerging almost powerless after the proceedings terminated, 
he barely managed to complete his lackluster and reaction­
ary term of office. However, he still endeavered to 
remain in power by imposing his own successor on the 
people. This attempt caused Obregon to revolt in April, 
1920 and on May 21, I920, rebels murdered Carranza in 
flight from the capital. Adolfo de la Huerta, who also 
revolted against Carranza, became provisional president 
and Mexico legally elected Obregon as President of the 
Republic in September, 1920. With the election of Alvaro 
Obregon the Revolution came to a close. Under Obregon's 
leadership, Mexico embarked on the road to peace, pros-
33 
Simpson, Many Mexicos, p. 306; E. V. Niemeyer, 
Jr., Revolution at Querdtaro The Mexican Constitutional 
Convention of 1916-1917 (Austint University of Texas 
Press, 197^)» pp. 233-23^. 
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perity and the attainment of the goals that emerged from 
34 
the Revolution. 
Perhaps, now, armed with a working knowledge of 
the Mexican Revolution it will be easier for the reader 
to comprehend the reasons behind the brutal treatment 
received by foreign investors in Chihuahua and Coahuila 
during the struggle. The remainder of this study will 
survey the diverse sectors of the Mexican economy in 
which foreign investors in the two states were deeply 
involved to take a closer look at the problems they 
encountered. Chapter II deals with foreigners involved 
in ranching while Chapter III revolves around those 
who invested in the railroad and the mining industries. 
Chapter IV is concerned with foreigners engaged in city 
businesses and Chapter V relates to some of the problems 
that all foreigners shared alike concerning Mexican law 
and taxation. 
34 
^ Simpson, Many Mexicos, pp. 308-309. 
CHAPTER II 
RANCHING AND FARMING 
The lure of cheap and abundant lands and labor 
drew many foreign ranchers and farmers to Mexico. During 
the peace of the Porfiriato, foreigners realized huge 
profits as livestock and crops brought excellent prices. 
But, with the beginning of the Revolution in 1910, farm­
ers and ranchers found themselves constantly victimized 
by revolutionaries, federales and bandits. These elements, 
seeking either to aggrandize themselves or to provide 
materials for the revolution, took whatever they needed, 
at the expense of the foreigner. 
The lands and personal property of foreigners 
became a special target to the Mexican. As late as 1910, 
only six per cent of the heads of families owned any 
land at all and the desire for land, especially that 
owned by foreigners, ranked high among the grievances 
/ 
that initiated the revolution against Porfirio Diaz. 
Bandits and rebels committed numerous depredations against 
foreign landowners and the mistreated Indians, robbed of 
/ 
their land during the Diaz regime, were especially 
vindictive as they revelled in the sufferings of their 
24 
25 
former masters.^ 
With the initial outburst of the Madero Revolu­
tion in 1910, foreigners saw trouble come from all 
quarters. The states of Chihuahua and Coahuila teemed 
with rebel activity, instigated to obtain material for 
the use of rebel forces in the revolt. John R. Blocker, 
the American owner of the Piedra Blanca Ranch in Coahuila, 
early fell victim to the rebel onslaught. General Caraveo, 
an Orozquista from Chihuahua, and his band paid a visit 
to Blocker and made their presence well known. The Mex­
icans took over one hundred horses and ten work mules 
and then killed forty hogs and all of the chickens, milch 
cows and calves on Blocker's ranch. The rebels stayed 
for four days, killed all the beef and took all the pro­
visions that they needed to eat. When they left, they 
robbed the commissary of $3,000 worth of provisions and 
left nothing to eat for the women and children on the 
ranch. Caraveo made his raid into Coahuila even more 
profitable when he moved on to the ranch of G. 0. Dela-
main, an Englishman, and confiscated all of Delamain's 
arms, saddles, bridles and provisions. To help outfit 
the soldaderas, the women who accompanied the rebel 
forces, Caraveo also seized all of Mrs. Delamain's 
^Fletcher, Rails, Mines and Progress, p. 18; 
Gerhardt, England and The Mexican Revolution, p. 1^1. 
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clothes. In spite of the fact that Francisco Madero had 
cautioned his followers not to molest the lives and 
property of foreigners, the ranchers and farmers still 
had to contribute heavily, often without compensation, 
2 
to the rebel cause. 
As the Revolution intensified, anarchy prevailed 
in the rural areas of Chihuahua and Cosihuila. The insur-
rectos took advantage of the fact that Federal forces did 
not dare to leave the railroads unprotected to chase after 
them and rampaged unchecked through foreign property. To 
add woe to the foreigners plight, bandits, not connected 
with the rebels or the Federales, emerged on the scene.^ 
By early 1911, farms and ranches in the North 
found themselves completely at the mercy of bandits and 
rebels. Near Parral, Chihuahua, bandits besieged a dairy 
farm owned by the Whatley family. The family had started 
their farm in I9OO with 200 Jersey cows, but little by 
little, the property found its way into rebel and bandit 
hands. By mid I9II, it had almost completely disappeared. 
One night the intruders, told by a farm employee that the 
2 
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, Fall Commit­
tee Report (Washington Government Printing Office, I920), 
S. Doc. 285, 66th Cong., 2d sess., Iill77-1180j 1j1135-
1136. Hereafter referred to as Fall Committee Report; 
New York Times, 22 November I9IO (New York, New Yorks 
Recordak Corporation). 
^New York Times, 10 March I9II. 
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family had $5»000, entered the house and demanded the 
money. The family pleaded that they did not have the 
money so the bandits took one of the daughters outside 
and threatened to cut off her fingers and her toes if 
they did not get the money at once. Continuous pleading 
eventually convinced the bandits that the family did not 
have $5»000 in the house so they took what money the 
Whatleys had and left. A short while later the Federal 
authorities apprehended the same bandits, but the desper­
ados served only one month in prison for their crime. 
During the Porfiriato, the bandits would have been 
shot!^ 
What help the Federales did give the foreigners 
faded as the Revolution progressed and revolutionary 
successes began to mount. After the stunning rebel vic­
tory at Casas Grandes on March 6, 1911* a wave of violence 
spread throughout the North as rebels became more secure. 
Depredations intensified, especially against the big 
ranching concerns, when it became necessary to commandeer 
more supplies to sustain the growing revolutionary forces. 
The Palomas Land and Cattle Company, an American ranch 
in Chihuahua, fell prey to numerous groups demanding 
horses, cattle, saddles, provisions and money. Passing 
rebels often shot cattle just for the sake of killing 
Fall Committee Report, 1»108^-1085. 
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the ranch's beef and then left the carcasses to rot. 
Rebels exacerbated the company's problems when they pur­
loined their hay and cut their fences.^ 
Pascual Orozco expertly relieved many foreigners 
of their property. When Orozco's men confiscated all of 
the cattle from a ranch adjoining the Babicora ranch in 
Chihuahua, J. C. Hayes, manager of the ranch, took his 
life in his hands when he foolishly protested vehemently 
to Orozco. Hayes maintained that the cattle belonged 
to him and presented documents proving his claim of 
ownership. This proved to be his undoing, however, 
because Orozco not only kept the cattle, but he incarcer­
ated Hayes, contending that he carried illegal documents. 
Fortunately for Hayes, Orozco released him a short 
while later.^ 
By the end of March, as rebel advances increased, 
protection provided by the Diaz regime for foreigners 
virtually disappeared. A mob of workers attacked six 
Americans at the Corrales Ranch near Jim^ez, Chihuahua 
and the Federal government, unable to help, authorized 
all Americans in the country to take up arms for their 
own protection. Sensing victory, rebels increased their 
^Fall Committee Report, 1:1103; Testimony of 
H. S. Stephenson, Vice President of the Palomas Land 
Company, 25 March I9II /1152. 
^New York Times, 18 March 1911* 
29 
confiscation of horses and supplies from foreign and 
Mexican ranches to prepare for the final onslaught. With 
their backs to the wall. Federal forces initiated their 
own horse stealing campaign in an effort to stop the 
insurrectos."^ However, Federal action came too late and 
/ 
the resignation of Diaz in late May finalized the Madero 
victory. 
/ 
With Diaz gone, foreign ranchers and farmers 
throughout Chihuahua and Coahuila eagerly anticipated 
some semblance of peace. However, this failed to mater­
ialize when anti-Madero uprisings began even before his 
installation in November, 1911. Ranchers and farmers 
near Torreon, Coahuila encountered heavy bandit activity 
in October. For three weeks a large band of 150 bandits 
embarked on a looting spree and committed numerous 
depredations on the ranches and farms in the area. 
Patrick 0*Hea, Manager of the British owned Cruces Ranch, 
and his men successfully repulsed the first bandit attack, 
but the employees threatened to desert him if he did not 
get more assistance. 0*Hea managed to enlist aid from 
the Madero authorities in Torreon and thus saved the 
8 
ranch from further attacks. 
"^H. L. Wilson to Knox, 24 March 1911 /1053j 
Thomas W. Voetter to Knox, 10 April 1911 /1360; and 
Voetter to Knox, 13 April I9II /1394. 
O 
Ellsworth to Knox, 9 November I9II /2k88,  
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The brief respite enjoyed by the Cruces Ranch 
slowly turned into a lull before the storm of new rebel­
lion. When in March 1912 a disgruntled Pascual Orozco, 
angry at not being named Madero's Minister of War, joined 
the anti-Madero forces. Northern Mexico again teemed with 
revolution.^ The Orozco defection came after the open 
revolt of Emilio Va'zquez Gomez and the followers of both 
men brought more grief to foreigners. To help finance 
their uprising, the Orozquistas and Vasquistas, joined 
by anti-Madero Magonistas and disgruntled peons, raided 
and robbed the ranches throughout Chihuahua and Coahuila. 
Magonistas detained an American rancher, Arthur B. Hines 
and relieved him of his money, valuables, saddle, arms 
and ammunition. Hines continued on his way to a ranch 
in Coahuila, arrived there on the fifteenth of March and 
on the eighteenth of March the Magonistas robbed the 
ranch. 
The anti-Madero forces resorted to extreme means 
to sustain their efforts. The San Gregorio Ranch in 
Coahuila lost all their horses, saddles, rifles and 
ammunition to the rebels, but even more important, the 
Q 
^Clarence C. Clendenen, Blood on the Border The 
United States Army and The MexicaH Irregulars (Londont 
The Macmillan Company, I969), pp. 132-133* 
^^Ellsworth to Knox, 11 February 1912 /2808; 
23 March I912 /3398. 
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rebels impressed all twenty of their employees into the 
rebel army. Throughout April, the Federales could not 
cope with the power of the Orozco rebels, but early in 
May, the tide began to turn as Maderistas, sparked by the 
leadership of Pancho Villa and Victoriano Huerta, success­
fully fought back. Throughout the latter half of 1912 
the dwindling Orozco rebellion resorted only to small 
guerrilla raids and spiteful reprisals against foreigners. 
Throughout the uprising and into 1913» foreigners 
feared for their lives and withdrew from embattled areas. 
John R. Blocker, who had earlier suffered at the hands of 
/ 
anti-Diaz rebels, was one of many forced to abandon their 
Mexican holdings. Blocker left behind 100 fine saddle 
horses valued at $5»000 and 1500 cattle, all of which the 
Orozqustas commandeered. No foreigner remained safe from 
the fury of Orozco as Pablo Hoffman, a German farmer in 
Chihuahua, discovered. Forty Orozquistas swooped down 
on his plantation, took his money and completely cleaned 
out his house of everything portable. The marauders 
culminated this act of terrorism by dynamiting Hoffman's 
house. Fortunately, Hoffman saved himself only by out-
racing the rebels to the river and then swimming to the 
^^Ellsworth to Knox, 3 April 1912 /3527} Paige W. 
Christiansen, "Pascual Orozco« Chihuahua Rebel Episodes 
in the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1915*** New Mexico Histor­
ical Review, April I96I, Vol. XXXVI, no. 2, pp. 113-115. 
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other side.^^ 
Although Orozco himself had fled Mexico in July, 
many of his followers fought on. As 1912 drew to a close, 
Orozquistas resorted to kidnaping foreigners for ransom. 
Arthur McCormick, manager of the Palomas Ranch in Chihua­
hua was held until the rebels received $5»000 and the 
abduction of John T. Cameron, another ranch owner in 
13 
Chihuahua, brought in another $2,500. 
The efforts of the Orozquistas and those of other 
anti-Madero forces, placed a severe strain on the Madero 
administration. His regime, never on a firm foundation 
since its inception, faltered badly during the uprisings 
and foreigners, able to survive only by paying ••blood 
moneys* to the rebels, hoped for the restoration of pro­
tection after Huerta successfully executed his coup 
against Madero in February, 1913• Unfortunately, their 
hopes received a severe setback when an anti-Huerta move­
ment arose almost immediately and swept through Chihuahua 
and Coahuila with a fury far exceeding that of the Orozco 
ik 
rebellion. 
Foreigners again found themselves at the mercy of 
12 
Ellsworth to Knox, 26 September 1912 /5128; 28 
September 1912 /5l42; and New York Times, 9 February 1913* 
^^Ellsworth to Knox, 1? October 1912 /5301. 
New York Times. 15 April 1913. 
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rebels, led by Venustiano Carranza, Pancho Villa, Alvaro 
Obregon, and Pablo Gonz^ez. Bandits also took advantage 
of the situation and roamed the countryside, terrorizing 
foreign ranchers and farmers. One bandit, Maclovio 
Herrera, led a band of 400 on a devastating rampage 
through Chihuahua. Herrera, violently anti-American, 
destroyed foreign property with a vengeance. Coahuila, 
too, became so infested with bandit activity that many of 
the foreigners who "toughed out" the Orozco rebellion 
reluctantly had to abandon their property. 
Constitutionalists (as the rebels were called) 
spared no one in their drive to finance the new revolt 
and foreigners contributed their share to the cause in a 
variety of ways. James D. Sheahan, an American who owned 
a large hacienda at Jimenez, Chihuahua, lost 151 saddle 
horses and a number of Percheron stallions, of no military 
value, to the rebels. Sheahan found one horse worth 
$^,000 ridden to death about five miles from his hacienda. 
Rebels in Coahuila kidnapped Frank Williams, a Texas 
cattleman and held him for $1,000 ransom. Williams could 
only produce $125, but the revolutionaries accepted it 
and theh freed him because no contribution was too small. 
The rebels even asked a young American farmer in Coahuila, 
^^John R. Silliman to William Jennings Bryan, 
26 April 1913 /7^03. 
3^ 
L. Childress, to donate if he wanted to. Childress, 
smart enough to see the folly of not contributing, 
donated his last twenty pesos. In return, the rebel 
leader gave him a letter which recommended him to the con­
sideration of any other rebel leader that came along. 
Needless to say, the letter meant nothing to other revolu­
tionaries in need of money. 
British ranchers also contributed heavily. W. B. 
Cloete had to pay $4,680 to the Carrancistas before they 
would allow his cattle to leave the country. Charged five 
dollars per head for each of his 936 cattle, Cloete paid 
the fee to prevent the rebels from confiscating all of 
his cattle.^"^ 
The Palomas Land and Cattle Company had more than 
its share of trouble with the reactionaries. Earlier 
their manager had been kidnapped by the Orozquistas and 
now, during the Constitutionalist revolt, the rebels 
kidnapped their bookkeeper and forced the company to pay 
a large ransom to have him returned. However, the ransom 
paid seemed extremely small compared to the thousands of 
dollars that they had to pay the Constitutionalists for 
the privilege of branding their own cattle. By May, I913, 
16 
Fall Committee Report, 212400; Silliman to 
Bryan, 10 May 1913 /7668. 
^"^Ellsworth to Bryan, 8 May 1913 /7472. 
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the company had had enough and complained to Secretary of 
State, William Jennings Bryan. Unfortunately for the 
company, the United States was not in a position at that 
time to intervene on their behalf. To add insult to 
injury, the rebel leader Maximo Castillo again kidnapped 
A. W. McCormick, the ranch manager, in September. This 
1 ft 
time his release cost the company $10,000. 
Unhampered by Federal forces in Chihuahua and 
Coahuila, the revolutionaries filched the beef of foreign 
and Mexican ranches, slaughtered it, and sold it cheaply 
to American butchers in Eagle Pass, Texas. By killing 
the beef first, the rebels could circumvent inspection 
by United States inspectors who condemned live stock that 
entered the area as a precaution against diseased cattle 
19 
entering the United States. 
Cattle ranchers wilted under Constitutionalist 
demands, but farmers in the two states received maltreat­
ment as well. Foreign cotton producers felt the sting 
of Pancho Villa in October when he ordered the entire 
cotton crop near Torreon, Coahuila to be harvested for 
sale in the United States. Villa volunteered to handle 
the transporting of the cotton, but the cotton growers 
had to pay eight cents per kilo of cotton as a war con-
18 
New York Times, 11 May 1913? 3 September 1913• 
^^Ellsworth to Bryan, 9 August 1913* 611.125/8. 
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tribution, which resulted in a severe loss of revenue 
20 
to the producers. 
Constitutionalists relentlessly badgered foreign 
ranchers and farmers throughout 1913 and the first half 
of 191^. Ma'ximo Castillo in January, 191^» ordered all 
Americans to stay out of Chihuahua or they would be shot 
on sight. Castillo's anger was triggered by the refusal 
of large American ranch owners in Western Chihuahua to 
pay tribute to both Villa and Castillo.^^ 
During the first part of the year, the Constitu­
tionalists, though racked by dissension between Villa 
and Carranza, had Huerta "on the run". Supported by 
United States arms, it appeared as if the Constitutional­
ists would soon be completely victorious. However, an 
incident occurred in February, 191^# which almost ended 
the Constitutionalist dream. Inflicting depredations at 
will upon foreigners throughout their struggle, the rebels 
went one step too far when one such depredation, commit­
ted against an English subject, caused an international 
furor. 
The incident involved a man named William S. 
Benton, a Scotsman who owned a 150,000 acre ranch west 
20 
New York Times, 22 October 1913# Silliman to 
Bryan, 29 December 1913 /10757. 
21 
New York Times, 2? January 1914. 
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of Chihuahua City. Benton, angry because of the destruc­
tion inflicted upon his property, went to see Pancho 
22 
Villa to voice his complaints, but never returned. 
The stories are extremely varied as to just what 
happened to Benton. One episode maintained that when 
Benton went to Juarez to see Villa, the two exchsuiged hot 
words, a revolver was drawn, but no shots fired because 
a woman stepped in between the two men. Villa then 
arrested Benton and later tried and convicted the Scots­
man on a charge of conspiracy against the rebel govern­
ment and with provoking and insulting General Villa. He 
was, according to this account, executed that same night 
in front of a grave that he dug for himself. One of Villa's 
aides, Rodolfo Fierro, shot him through the head.^^ 
Another version of the killing maintained that 
Fierro did not shoot Benton. According to this account, 
Fierro did force Benton to dig his own grave but, instead 
of using a bullet, Fierro decided to kill him with a 
blow to the head. Fierro then buried Benton, still hand­
cuffed. Both of these accounts are refuted by a third 
version, which holds that Benton never Left Villa's 
office alive. According to this report, he died after 
22 
New York Times, 19 February 191^. 
23 
New York Times, 20 February 191^J 21 February 
191^1 and Fall Committee Report, I1I785. 
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being shot by several of Villa's aides who thought that 
he reached for a gun when he attempted to take out his 
handkerchief. 
A final version of the killing stated that Ben­
ton's body had been stabbed and not shot. Villa's men 
then mutilated his body in a manner suggestive of savages 
when they slashed it so many times in the breast and face 
that even his best friends would hardly be able to iden­
tify his remains. This story also said that Benton only 
went to see Villa in the first place to offer him rifles 
in exchange for the right to ship cattle across the 
border. 
By whatever means and circumstance caused Benton's 
death, the case caused an uproar from Mexico to London 
and posed a problem for President Woodrow Wilson. Since 
the United States would not allow any other power to 
intervene in Mexico or Latin America, a basic tenet of 
the Monroe Doctrine, she took responsibility for the con­
duct of other nations and for the protection of all for­
eigners in this hemisphere. Because of this and also 
because Wilson actively supported the Constitutionalists, 
many considered him responsible for Benton's death. France 
oil 
Atkin, Revolution;, p. 170; Lister and Lister, 
Chihuahua, p. 235* 
^^New York Times. 19 March 191^. 
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immediately blamed Wilson for the death and England 
quickly followed suit. English subjects throughout Mex­
ico vociferously demanded an immediate investigation by 
the English Consul in Chihuahua. They also insisted that 
England intervene at once to protect their lives, since 
Wilson could not help them. The United States averted 
a major crisis only after William Jennings Bryan's promise 
to investigate the death proved acceptable to England. 
Bryan then formed a commission in the United States to 
view Benton*s body in order to determine the exact cause 
of death. 
To state their position on the Benton case, the 
Constitutionalists had made public the records of Benton*s 
trial which asserted that Benton wanted to return to his 
property, but Villa would not allow that because Benton 
sympathized with the Federales. Benton then drew a pistol 
from his hip pocket and threatened Villa's life. For 
these crimes. Villa's court quickly found Benton guilty 
27 
and sentenced him to be shot. ' 
The American commission still wanted to view the 
body, but the rebels would not turn it over to them 
because they said that Benton was naturalized in Mexico 
Atkin, Revolution!, p. 171; Gerhardt, England 
and the Mexican Revolution 1910-1920, pp. 324-332; New 
York Times, 25 February 1914; and 1 March I9I6. 
^"^New York Times, 22 February 1914. 
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and was, therefore, a Mexican citizen, an allegation 
denied by Benton's widow, George Carothers, American Con­
sul at Torreoli, felt that the Mexicans delayed the commis­
sion as much as possible while they exhumed Benton's body 
so they could stand it upright while they fired a volley 
of shots into the corpse to make it look as if he had been 
executed by a firing squad. Villa's chief medical officer 
knew that this action would not fool the commission so 
he began to prepare the body to be viewed by the Ameri-
28 
cans. 
At this point, Carranza, in spite of his quarrels 
with Villa over military policies, intervened into the 
case and halted the commission's trip to view the body. 
Carranza demanded that the commission work through him, 
and not Villa, if they wanted to exhume the body. A few 
days later Carranza ordered his own Benton inquiry, end­
ing any chance that the commission might view the body. 
After Carranza entered the case, the affair ended, just 
29 
as quickly as it began. 
The affair afforded a close call for the Consti­
tutionalists because if England had been able to convince 
Wilson that the Constitutionalists should have been 
28 
New York Times, 24 February 1914; Fall Commit­
tee Report, 1j1785» 
29 
New York Times, 2 March 1914; 4 March 1914; and 
Atkin, Revolution!, p. 173» 
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punished for the Benton affair, arms support may have 
been discontinued. The United States may also have inter­
vened against the Constitutionalists. Had United States 
support been withdrawn and had intervention taken place, 
the course of the revolution would have been drastically 
altered. 
While the Constitutionalists treaded somewhat 
more lightly for awhile in their relations with foreigners 
after the Benton affair, bandits still remained active. 
In Western Chihuahua a bandit group connected with the 
Federales and led by Rodrigo Quevedo demanded a ransom, to 
be paid within twenty-four hours, from three American 
ranches. The bandits threatened to destroy the ranches* 
windmills, water tanks and ranch houses if their demands 
went unheeded. The ranches paid the $6,000 to prevent 
thousands of their cattle from dying of thirst.30 
When the United States intervened in Veracruz 
during April, 191^» Huerta lost needed revenue to continue 
his struggle. Constitutionalist victories increased 
rapidly and by mid July, 191^, the struggle ended. How­
ever, the final split between Villa and Carranza, which 
actually occurred one month before Huerta resigned, kept 
Mexico in a state of turmoil as each vied for control of 
the Revolution. Again, foreign ranchers contributed their 
30 
New York Times, 7 May 1914. 
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share to sustain the struggle of the contending factions. 
Throughout the remainder of 1914 and into the new year, 
foreign owned ranches and farms lost livestock, crops, 
and money to Carrancistas and Villistas. During March, 
1915* Carrancistas under Maclovio Herrera looted numerous 
ranches around San Carlos, Coahuila, and either killed or 
carried away all of their livestock. Herrera did not 
enjoy the fruits of his labor, however, because the 
Villistas overtook him and relieved him of the livestock 
and his wagons. 
X 
Villistas, under Colonel Joaquin Terrazas, placed 
more pressure on the Americans in the Muzquiz, Coahuila, 
area when they demanded that each American-owned hacienda 
deliver twenty head of cattle to the military authorities 
or have their property confiscated. George Carothers, 
the consular agent at Torreon attached to the Villistas, 
complained to Villa about Terrazas endeavors and Villa, 
still eager to maintain United States support, rescinded 
the order. As a parting gesture, however, the violently 
anti-American Terrazas seized all of the horses and mules 
from the ranch of Herman Brendel, an American citizen. 
P. Blocker to Bryan, 20 March 1915 /14648} 
22 March 1915 /14662. 
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Throughout September, 1915* the Constitutionalists 
forced Villa to retreat. As he fell back, he seized what­
ever livestock and provisions he could take with him. 
The Constitutionalists, in the wake of Villa's retreat, 
picked up what he left behind. During the month, rumors 
abounded about the possibility of United States recogni­
tion for Carranza. The rumors appeared very well sub­
stantiated when the Secretary of State notified all 
Americans and other foreigners that it would be best if 
they left territory still held by the Villistas, In 
reprisal to the proposed recognition of Carranza, Villa 
begsui to confiscate American property. He also demanded 
$50,000 gold from the Corralitos Cattle Company in Western 
Chihuahua, owned by E. D. Morgan. Villa threatened to 
kill Morgan's entire herd of 5»000 if Morgan refused his 
terms. 
United States recognition for Carranza came on 
October 19» 1915• Woodrow Wilson pledged that he would 
hold Carranza to his promises of protecting foreign lives 
and property throughout Mexico, but Pancho Villa made 
Carranza*s pledges impossible to keep. Villa, incensed 
with the recognition, vowed he would attack foreigners, 
especially Americans, and said he was through dealing with 
L. Cobb to Lansing, 30 September 1915 /1633^J 
Gerhardt, England and The Mexican Revolution 1910-1920, 
p. 392; and New York Times, 15 October 1915« 
the United States. 
As 1915 drew to a close. Villa embarked on a 
spree of vicious reprisals. At Tlahualilo, Coahuila, 
Villistas encountered a Spaniard bringing in a herd of 
goats. When the Spaniard could not produce the invoice 
covering his ownership of the animals, the Villistas shot 
him and confiscated the goats. Near Madera, Chihuahua, 
Villa and his men seized the Babicora ranch owned by 
William Randolph Hearst and his mother Phoebe. The Villis­
tas looted the ranch, drove most of the cattle away, and 
then abducted an Englishman and four American employees.35 
By early 1916, Villa's continuous plundering was 
widespread throughout Northern Mexico. The helpless 
Carranza could not stop the marauders and law and order 
disappeared. Villa returned to the Babicora Ranch in late 
January, took 500 colts, and killed 250 cattle a day to 
provide provisions for a new military campaign. 
Bandits again took advantage of the situation 
and the rural areas of Chihuahua and Coahuila bustled 
with bandit activity. Desperados completely overran the 
34 
Gerhardt, England and The Mexic^ Revolution 
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area around Torreon and Parras and most of the foreigners 
abandoned their property, once again. In Chihuahua, 
bandits abducted Juan Bilboa, the cousin of an Italian 
rancher named Enrico Visconti, and then murdered Visconti 
when he refused to pay the $1,500 ransom demanded for 
his cousin. Fortunately for Bilboa, friends and relatives 
paid the money to obtain his release. 
When the Pershing Punitive Expedition began to 
chase Villa after his raid on Columbus, New Mexico, 
Villa grew more hostile. Everywhere he went Villa 
announced his intention of putting to death every gringo 
that fell into his hands. Still no help came from Car­
ranza and Villa's depredations intensified. But now, 
Americans began to fight back. At the Hearst Babicora 
Ranch, eighty vaqueros were armed, the ranch buildings 
barricaded and the windows rimmed with sandbags in 
anticipation of Villista or bandit attacks. In late May, 
/ 
1916, bandits under the command of Atezutro Dominguez 
and Pedro Castillo suffered almost complete annihilation 
at the hands of a group composed of twenty-five of the 
Babicora vaqueros. The bandits, not Villistas, had 
joined together to fight Carranza and Americans.^® 
^"^Blocker to Lansing, 20 March I916 /175^^5 New 
York Times, 20 March I9I6. 
^^New York Times, 2 April 1916; 14 May I916; and 
20 May 191^1 
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The Hearst Ranch, with its armed vaqueros, would 
surely have been safe from the likes of a former member 
/ 
of Orozco's band, Jose Inez Salazar. Salazar decided to 
start his own revolution about the same time that the cow­
boys began to fight back. On a daring raid, Salazar and 
his band, all three of them, attacked the Santo Domingo 
Ranch in Chihuahua and came away with several bags of 
flour. Salazar*s merry band consisted of a cripple, a 
man with one eye, and another who was deaf and dumb.^^ 
The Hearst Ranch repelled the bandits, but could 
not handle the Carrancistas. Carranza, himself cantanker­
ous toward the Pershing Expedition, ordered the seizure 
of the Ranch because the Babicora Development Company had 
sold cattle and supplies to United States authorities to 
be used as provisions by the United States military 
forces in Mexico. John C. Hayes, the American manager of 
the ranch, earlier had fled with 110 horses to keep them 
from being seized by the Carrancistas. 
Carrancista troops posed many problems for the 
foreigners they supposedly had been pledged to protect. 
Many soldiers deserted and turned to banditry because they 
could not feed themselves or clothe and feed their fami­
lies on the five cents a day that the Government paid 
^^New York Times, 12 May 1916. 
^^New York Times, 11 July 1916; 14 July I9I6. 
^7 
them. Often, the hungry troops resorted to killing 
ki 
cattle and raiding fields to satisfy their needs. 
The Pershing Expedition began to withdraw in 
early 191? and relations between the United States and 
Carranza improved. Villa, however, remained just as 
active as before. Jose Inez Salazar joined the Villistas 
and in February he attacked the American owned Ojitos 
Ranch in Northern Chihuahua, kidnapped the ranch foreman. 
Bunk Spencer, and held him until the ranch paid a $5,000 
ransom. Julio Acosta, another Villa commander, raided 
and completely looted the Naherachie Ranch, owned by Mrs. 
Phoebe Hearst, near Madera. Villistas also looted the 
Palomas Cattle Company as they ravaged unchecked through 
42 
Chihuahua. 
Taking advantage of the fact that many Carranza 
officials abandoned their pursuit of him and began loot­
ing instead. Villa continued his reign of terror well 
into 1920. Caught between the Villistas, bandits and 
rebellious Carrancistas, foreign ranchers and farmers 
could only bide their time, hoping someday for an end to 
their hardships. James D. Sheahan, who had trouble with 
the Carrancistas in 1913 on his hacienda near Jimenez, 
Blocker to Lansing, 11 October I916 /195^; 1^ 
October I9I6 /19529. 
ho 
New York Times, 15 February 1917* I6 February 
1917; and 17 February 1917. 
typified the plight of the foreigner in Chihuahua and 
Coahuila during the Revolution. Each time Sheahan would 
harvest his crop, the Villistas or the Carrancistas 
would take it. If the Villistas took the crop, the 
Carrancistas would charge that he was a Villa sympathizer 
and would damage his property. If the Carrancistas took 
the crop, the Villistas charged that he sympathized with 
Carranza and they would damage his property. Undaunted, 
Sheahan kept plsinting his crops because he never lost 
hope that someday the trouble would end, and when it did, 
he would have something to make a new start on.^^ 
The foreign rancher and farmer who went to Mexico 
with dreams of owning his own land and making a good 
living from it saw his dreams turn into nightmares during 
the Mexicaji Revolution. Isolated, in most cases, from 
any type of protection, the ranches and farms fell prey 
to the demands of countless bandits, rebels, and Federal 
forces. Ranches and farms, once objects of beauty and 
pride, were devastated almost beyond repair. Countless 
foreign ranchers and farmers, forced to abandon their 
life's work, never returned again. Often, those with the 
courage to return to their holdings found nothing left 
to come back to. However, even if his property was 
destroyed, he still had his life; many of the foreigners 
^^Fall Committee Report, 2j2400-2401 
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were not as fortunate. As an obstacle in the path of 
the land-starved Mexican's quest for his own property, 
the foreigner was expendable. 
CHAPTER III 
MINING AND RAILROADS 
The Mexican mining industry, from which the Con-
quistadores extracted so much wealth, fell into a pro­
longed slump during the years following the conquest. It 
was revitalized during the Porfiriato as foreign owners, 
taking advantage of the handsome concessions offered by 
Porfirio Diaz, invested large amounts of capital in the 
hope of procuring the remaining riches from the Mexican 
mines. Cheap labor and internal peace also added a 
further incentive to the profit-minded foreigner. The 
foreign mine owners brought to Mexico a knowledge of 
modern chemistry and new machinery so essential to the 
exploration and efficient exploitation of the mines. Diaz 
provided railroads so the mine owners could more easily 
transport their heavy machinery and supplies, enabling 
them to open up new mines in remote areas. The railroads 
also made it much easier to get the ore to the smelters 
and from there, the ore could be exported much faster and 
cheaper.^ The two industries were tied closely together 
^Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry 1890-1950, 
pp. 17-20; p. 33. 
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because the mines depended on the railroads to take their 
ore to market. When the Revolution struck, the damage 
inflicted against the railroads severely affected the 
mining industry as well. 
The Mines 
Like the ranches, the mines* isolated location 
made them easy prey for bandits and rebels. During the 
initial stages of the Madero Revolution, the mines were 
robbed of arms, ammunitions and supplies so frequently 
that many mines closed down by March I9II. One American 
manager wrote back to the United States, telling his 
friends and family that if they decided to visit him, 
they would have to bring their own food because the rebels 
had taken all that he had. Trouble came from all quarters 
as witnessed by the Boston Mexico Development Company in 
Chihuahua which fell victim to 200 insurrectos who helped 
themselves to provisions from the company store and from 
the house of the manager, Daniel C. Sutton. Several days 
later, the company was robbed by the Federales.^ 
During the Madero Revolution, the mining compan­
ies surrendered unlimited arms and supplies, and some 
ores to the rebels, but surprisingly very little physical 
2 
New York Times, 2^ March I9II; Testimony by 
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damage was done to the property. During the Orozco 
rebellion against Madero, however, rebel attacks on the 
mines became much more destructive. Two hundred 
/ 
Orozquistas sacked the store of the Rio Tinto Copper 
Company in Chihuahua and then burned the pumping plant 
to the ground. The company had already been looted three 
times by the rebels, but this was the first time they 
destroyed property. Mine officials throughout Chihuahua 
feared closing down because their men would join the 
rebels and perhaps bring even more destruction to their 
properties in retaliation for the low wages they received.^ 
The problems mining men initially encountered 
seemed extremely minimal when compared with those brought 
on by the Constitutionalist revolt against Huerta and 
the ensuing internal struggle for power between Villa 
and Carranza, once Huerta had resigned. Carrancistas 
and Villistas constantly visited the mines, impressed the 
employees into their army, sacked and destroyed property 
and often kidnapped foreign employees and mine officials 
for ransoms. Nils Olaf Bagge, president of the Almoloya 
Mining Company between Parral and Jimene"^, encountered 
Villistas far too often as his mine was robbed successively 
by rebel Generals Urbina, Villa, and Herrera. Herrera 
^Consular Reports, 7 February 1912 /2776; Ellsworth 
to Knox, 18 March 1912 /33^1» Letcher to Knox, 21 October 
1912 /530^j and 26 October 1912 /5357. 
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also kidnapped the mine's superintendent, impressed him 
into his force, and did not release him until a 750 peso 
4 
ransom was paid. 
While Villa and his men made life miserable for 
the miners in Chihuahua, the Carrancistas swept through 
Coahuila, preying on every mining concern they encountered. 
The rebels seized so much property from the New Sabinas 
Coal Company that the British owners had no choice but 
to close down all their mines, leaving 3»000 men unem­
ployed.^ 
The Mazapil Copper Company in Saltillo fell 
victim to a demand by the rebels to contribute 50»000 
pesos, even though the Federales still controlled Saltillo. 
The request had been telegraphed from Concepcion del Oro 
by the rebel chief Eulalio Gutie'rrez, who said that the 
money would be used to buy necessities for "the Army for 
the Restoration of the Constitution." The general mana­
ger of the company, P.E.G. Carr. notified Guti^rez that 
he did not have the authority to use 50,000 pesos out of 
the company's fund because if he did take the money, he 
would be held personally responsible, Guti^rez then 
reduced his demand to 25>000 pesos, but said he would 
blow up the company's plant at Concepci<^ del Oro if he 
4 
Fall Committee Report, 1j1429-1431. 
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did not receive the money. Carr sent the money and did 
not tell the Federales of the threat because he feared 
Federales might stop delivery of the money, forcing 
the rebels to destroy the plant in retaliation. 
Unfortunately for the company, the Federales 
later found out about the transaction. They then cut 
the telegraph wires between Saltillo and Concepcion del 
Oro and destroyed a number of sections of track of the 
company's railroad believed to be utilized by the rebels. 
The destruction of the track cut off the escape route for 
many of the company's employees at Concepcion del Oro, 
forcing them to endure rebel depredations."^ 
In August, 1913* the mining town of Lampacitos, 
Coahuila, suffered complete annihilation by the Constitu­
tionalists who destroyed over $1,000,000 worth of pro­
perty, mostly French owned, in their attempt to eradicate 
foreigners. The Mazapil Copper Company lost over $1,000, 
000 when the rebels burned the office buidlings and 
smelter at their plant in Concepcion del Oro, the same 
plant that P.E.O. Carr had earlier paid 25,000 pesos to 
protect. 
^John R. Silliman to Bryan, 5 June 1913 /7865. 
"^Silliman to Bryan, 18 June 1913 /7996. 
8 
New York Times, 22 August 1913; W. P. Blocker 
to Bryan, 23 January 1914 /I0670. 
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On April 2, 19l^» the Constitutionalists entered 
and sacked the town of Las Esperanzas, Coahuila. During 
the raid they forced A. J. Ruckman, general manager of 
Las Esperanzas Mining Company, to march down the street 
at the point of a rifle and ordered him to yell "Viva 
Carranza," but, Ruckman refused, claiming his American 
citizenship dictated that he take no political side. 
Fortunately for Ruckman, he did not lose his life, but 
the rebels still confiscated a large supply of provisions 
Q 
from his company store. 
By the beginning of May 191^, foreign mining 
companies in Coahuila forcibly contributed so much to the 
rebel cause that almost every mine, financially unable 
to operate, ceased operations. Still, the rebels demanded 
more, as Carranza ordered the siezure of the five largest 
coal mines, all owned by French and American companies. 
The companies, valued at several million dollars, still 
operated, but now the Carrancistas, eager to provide 
coal for their trains, supplied the manpower. The 15,000 
tons of coal and the 25,000 tons of coke that the company 
had stockpiled also found its way to the Constitutional­
ists* mineral coffer.^® 
Coahuila miners wilted under Carranza demands. 
^Blocker to Bryan, 9 April 191^ /ll^93» 
^^New York Times, 28 May 1914. 
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but Villa became even more belligerent to miners through­
out Mexico after his split with Carranza. Miners in 
Villa's home state of Chihuahua especially suffered from 
his hostilities during his reign of terror. In July, 
1915, Villa demanded a forced loan of $300,000 in gold 
from Chihuahua Mining companies and followed up this 
demand by calling a mining and smelter conference to be 
held in Chihuahua City on August 9« Fear swept through 
the mining community that Villa would use the conference 
to inform the miners that he intended to confiscate all 
the bullion of precious metal mines and smelters and 
then melt all the bullion together to destroy any means 
of identification. Fortunately for the miners, George 
Carothers arranged a meeting between Villa and United 
States Army General Hugh Scott before the conference 
was to be held. Scott and Villa met before in 1914, 
when Woodrow Wilson sent the American General to Villa's 
camp to explain the United States' position in the Consti 
tutionalist struggle against Huerta. The men became 
close friends and nurtured a mutual respect for one 
another. Because of this reciprocal respect and friend­
ship, Scott persuaded Villa to cancel his planned con­
ference. The miners breathed a sigh of relief, but the 
respite was short-lived because after the United States 
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recognized Carranza, Villa became even more vengeful. 
Villa's actions after Carranza's recognition, 
coupled with increased bandit activity, created havoc 
for the mining companies. Villa's robberies of trains 
made it extremely difficult for the companies to trans­
port their ore. The employees of the American Smelting 
and Refining Company refused to ride the ore trains unless 
they received much higher wages. They simply would not 
risk the chance of meeting the infamous Villa unless the 
companies paid handsomely for their services. Many 
employees of other companies refused to ride the ore 
trains at any wage, so the companies brought in new 
employees from the United States who would take the risk. 
Unfortunately, many of the new crews never reached the 
companies because rebels, and sometimes Federales, inter-
12 
cepted the men and impressed them into their army. 
Villa, alone, had almost paralyzed the mining 
industry in Chihuahua and Coahuila in 1915. The Pershing 
Expedition in I916 stirred up even more anti-American and 
pro-Villa sentiment, both of which worked to the detriment 
of foreigners. Although Villa curtailed his activities 
11 
Atkin, Revolution!, p. 172; Z. L. Cobb to Lan­
sing, 26 July 1915 /155^5» 3 August 1915 /1563O; and Hugh 
Scott to Lansing, 10 August 1915 /15719» 
12 
Marion Letcher to Lansing, 9 September 1915 
/l6l64; Cobb to Lansing, 8 February I9I6 /l?3^5i and 11 
April 1916 /I78I3. 
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for a short while, anti-American Mexicans kept up the 
attack on American mining companies. Mexican mobs in 
Parral, Chihuahua, sacked and burned American mining 
properties after mob leaders had inspired them by firing 
on the expeditionary force near Parral. The Carranza 
authorities in the city stood by as the frenzied mob 
destroyed over $3,000,000 worth of American property. 
To add to the problem, Carranza also helped himself to 
200,000 ounces of bullion from the Alvarado Mining and 
Milling Company of Parral. He later graciously returned 
75 per cent of the bullion, but still kept 25 per cent 
13 
as security for taxes. 
Villa became active again in October, I916, and 
looted mining towns throughout Chihuahua and Coahuila, 
impressing all able bodied men into his army. Villa 
forced the men to join under threat of burning to death 
their families. In November he went to Parral, stole 
seventy-five bars of silver valued at $50,000 from an 
American mining camp. At the town plaza he spoke to 
the adoring throng about his overwhelming desire to 
fight the American expeditionary forces. After the 
speech, American and other foreign mining men, fearing 
for their lives, left for the United States. One Amer-
^^Carothers to Lansing, 14 April I916 /I7863; 
New York Times, 3 July I9I6. 
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ican mining man, Howard Gray, did not make it. The 
Villistas shot him to death in his doorway and then 
hung his body from Villa's mam column. 
Villa kept up his assaults on the mining compan­
ies and throughout the next four years he victimized 
them constantly. In June, 1917, Villistas raided the 
Erupcion Mine near Villa Ahumada, Chihuahua, and detained 
the English manager and a Russian well digger until they 
received 3»000 pesos in ransom. In late December, 1918, 
Villa looted the offices and houses of the Cusi Mining 
Company and burned about $20,000 worth of property. 
Villa's increased activity around Chihuahua City 
in early 1919» forced mining men to sleep at night in 
Chihuahua City and limited their stay at the mines just 
to the daylight hours. Mining offices had to be moved 
into town because Villa still maintained hope of receiv­
ing steady contributions from the mining companies. He 
fervently made speeches to the mine workers, enticing 
them to claim their rights and to demand higher wages. 
The Villista struggle against Carranza, though 
diminished, continued through 1919* Rebels still sought 
^^New York Times, 3 October 1916; 15 October 1916; 
8 November 1916; 16 November 1916; and 8 December I9I6. 
^^Cobb to Lansing, 8 June I917 /21028; L. C. Neale 
to G. H. Shaw, State Department, 26 December I9I8 /22438. 
^^J. Stewart to Lansing, 8 February I9I9 /22516. 
6o 
out materials and money from the mines to keep the move­
ment going. In March, the rebels raided the Providencia 
mining camp near Saltillo. In the raid, the rebels 
looted the company store and took eleven cases of dyna­
mite and considerable fuses and blasting caps. From 
the employees* homes, the rebels also confiscated food, 
clothing, and blankets.^*^ 
Villa captured Parral again in April, 1919, took 
all the trucks of foreign mining concerns, and made 
heavy demands on the companies. He called all the 
foreign mine owners together and told them to operate 
their mines, but ordered them to pay a certain amount 
of money for protection. One company, the Alvarado 
Company, refused to meet Villa's demands so he took pos­
session of the plant and melted down and confiscated 
their silver bullion valued at $150,000 gold. He then 
placed dynamite in the plant and threatened to blow it 
1 fl 
up if the Federales attacked the town. 
The year 1920 saw Pancho Villa finally retire, 
but even before he left, his place was taken by the 
supporters of Alvaro Obregon, who also revolted against 
Carranza. The Obregonistas, like the Villistas, called 
17 
'Harry Morgan, Vice Consul in Saltillo, to 
Lansing, 18 March 1919 /22587. 
18 
Acting Consul Sterling to Lansing, 23 April 
1919 /22644; 4 May 1919 /2269O; and 11 May 1919 /22689. 
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upon foreign miners to contribute to their cause. How­
ever, their struggle proved much shorter than Villa's 
and some degree of peace from rebel, bandit and Federal 
demands finally came to the foreign miners in late 1920. 
The long Revolution had indeed been "hell" for 
foreign mining companies in Chihuahua and Coahuila. 
Isolated even more than the ranchers, miners received 
little, if any. Federal protection from the incursions 
of those who robbed and destroyed their properties. The 
riches that lured them to Mexico in the beginning unfor­
tunately also attracted the warring factions of Mexico 
and by the end of the long struggle, much of the displaced 
wealth found its way back into Mexican hands. 
The Railroads 
No industry during the Revolution suffered as 
much devastation as did the railroad industry. Railroad 
trains and rails suffered daily destruction at the hands 
of rebels and Federales who sought to stem the advances 
of the opposition. Trains were held up, railroad offi­
cers kidnapped for ransom, and company offices looted 
as contending forces and bandits searched for money 
and materials to continue the struggle or to aggrandize 
their personal well being. Adding more woes was the 
fact that foreign railroad workers, hated by Mexicans 
because of the treatment they gave Mexican railroad 
62 
passengers and because they received so much more pay 
than the Mexican workers, often received brutal treat­
ment or even death during the Revolution. From one day 
to the next, the status of every railroad company in 
Mexico remained in doubt. The companies had so many 
troubles operating that one line in Coahuila, The Coa-
huila Pacific Railroad, had been nicknamed the Cuando 
Puede (When It Can).^^ 
During the Madero Revolution, the Federales fre­
quently blew up railroad lines to keep the rebels from 
advancing. When it became evident that the rebels would 
win, many Federal soldiers deserted, turned to banditry, 
and robbed the railroad companies. In May, 1911, at 
Monclova, Coahuila, ten Federal deserters entered the 
offices of the National Railways and forced the cashier 
to give them 30,000 pesos. The soldiers then escaped 
by taking one of the company's train engines, a coach 
and two water cars. As the robbers moved South, they 
burned bridges behind them and tore down telegraph wires. 
The deserters finally abandoned the train and joined the 
rebels. 
During the Orozco Rebellion, railroads came under 
19 . . / 
Jamieson, Tulitas of Torreon, p. 135* 
20 
^Ellsworth to Knox, l6 May I9II /1797; 18 May 
1911 /I912. 
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more attack. The American agent of the line at Sabinas, 
Coahuila, J. W. Perry, received a letter from the 
Orozquistas telling him to bum a bridge at the station 
or else he would be shot. Ironically, the letter also 
offered 5fO00 pesos to Perry if he accomplished the act. 
Perry did not bum the bridge, but quickly left the 
area instead. 
In Chihuahua the rebels robbed so many American 
train passengers that 1,200 American employees of the 
Mexican National Railways initiated a strike. They 
believed the Mexican Government intentionally proposed 
to eliminate them because the Federales had given them 
absolutely no protection from rebel incursions. On one 
train trip alone, between Chihuahua City and Ciudad 
Jua'rez, bandits relieved fifty American passengers of 
2? 
all their valuables. 
When the Constitutionalist revolt against Huerta 
broke out, the railroads suffered even greater losses. 
At Piedras Negras, Coahuila, Colonel Jesu'^ Carranza 
began the assault on the railroads when he robbed $3»000 
from the pay car of the Mexican National Railway. Actions 
such as this during the bitter struggle forced many rail-
^^Ellsworth to Knox, 2 March 1912 /32l6. 
L. Wilson to Knox, 26 February 1913 /6^75» 
New York Times, 18 November 1913* 
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roads to close dovm because of the loss of so much 
money and property. When the Northwestern Railroad, a 
Canadian line, closed down in Chihuahua, Villa threatened 
to confiscate the company if they did not immediately 
repair and operate the line. This threat forced the 
company, in spite of danger to life and property, to 
23 
resume operations. 
A major railroad disaster occurred in January, 
1914, when Maximo Castillo, a ruthless anti-American 
bandit in Chihuahua, set fire to a freight train and then 
placed it in the Cumbre Tunnel, located between Pearson 
and Madera. Castillo then allowed a passenger train 
to run far into the tunnel. Although the passenger 
train did not crash into the burning freight train, 
thirteen Americans and fifty Mexicans suffocated from 
the smoke and flames while trying to reach the entrance 
24 
of the long tunnel. 
Both of the trains destroyed by Castillo belonged 
to the Mexican Northwestern Railroad, which had more 
trouble with bandits in 1915* This time, bandits seized 
Edward Ledwidge, the Commissary Superintendent of the 
railroad, and two of his assistants. From their camp 
23 
Ellsworth to Knox, 26 February 1913 /6475; 
New York Times, 18 November 1913* 
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New York Times, 8 February 1914. 
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in the mountains, the bandits released the two assistants 
so they could travel to Juarez to obtain the $10,000 
ransom demanded to free Ledwidge. Before the money 
arrived, Ledwidge gave the bandits $13»000 in Villa 
money in return for his release, but the bandits showed 
their disdain for the worthless currency by burning it 
in their campfire. Fortunately, when the $10,000 reached 
25 
the bandits, Ledwidge was freed. 
Depredations against the railroads in Chihuahua 
and Coahuila centered around the activity of Pancho Vila 
for the greater part of 1915 and I916, As Obregcm closed 
in on him during the Carranza-Villa contest. Villa made 
a last ditch grab at goods and merchandise to forestall 
his defeat. At Ju^ez, he seized all the goods from the 
railroad warehouses, including all the coal and coke the 
railroad had on hand. In a violent effort to get more 
coal from the railroads. Villa threatened to burn all of 
the foreign freight cars if he did not receive all that 
he needed. On January 16, I916, Villa, not satisfied 
with his share of coal, burned a large number of the 
freight cars and killed the bookkeeper of the Mexican 
26 
Northwestern Railroad. 
^^New York Times, I3 September 1915* 
P A 
Cobb to Lansing, 4 August 1915 /1563^» ^ Novem­
ber 1915 /I6703; and New York Times, 11 January I916. 
66 
A few days later near Santa Ysabel, Chihuahua, 
Villistas, led by Pablo Lo'pez, robbed a train carrying 
thousands of dollars in currency and a large quantity 
of merchandise owned by American miners returning to 
resume operations of their mines after they had received 
guarantees of safety from Carranza. In brutal fashion, 
the Mexicans forced the Americans from the train, robbed 
sind then killed them, then stripped bare the mangled 
bodies. Only one member of the party, Thomas Holmes, 
was fortunate enough to escape the ruthless massacre. 
Lo'pez told the Mexican passengers to have a good time 
and "watch us kill the Gringos". To help them along 
with their good time, L^ez also robbed the Mexicans. 
Villa, who denied any responsibility for the 
killings, said that Lopez completely exceeded his orders. 
Since the robbers were Villistas, however. Villa still 
received the blame. The massacre touched off massive 
mob protests on the United States side of the border, 
but no United States troops entered Mexico to hunt Villa 
down. The following month, Lopez received orders from 
Villa to return to the area around Santa Ysabel to hold 
up all passing trains and to kill any American or China-
27 
New York Times, 12 January 1916; Atkin, Revolu-
tion!, p. 269; and Clendenen, Blood On The Border, p. 
19b. 
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man that might be aboard. 
The remaining years of the Revolution brought 
increased agony from all quarters to the Mexican North­
western Railroad. In June, 1916, Carranza seized the 
railroad for a period because he needed it for immediate 
military transportation. After Carranza returned the 
railroad, the Villistas started their attacks once again. 
On November 6, 1917» they robbed one of the company's 
trains South of Chihuahua City and escaped with the $100, 
000 worth of silver bullion being sent to the United 
States. The following year. Villa extracted a $50,000 
forced loan from the company and then again on May 29, 
1919, the Villistas blew up $15»000 worth of the company's 
bridges and railroad cars because the company refused 
to meet Villa's demand for yet another forced loan.^^ 
Villa continued his plundering of railroads into 
1920 when on March 4, he blew up a train, killed both of 
the conductors and hung a Syrian passenger. Villa also 
abducted an American until he received a ransom for his 
release. Villa robbed all the other passengers and then 
28 
Atkin, Revolution!, pp. 270-271; Letcher to 
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looted and burned the train. 
The railroad industry in Chihuahua and Coahuila 
enjoyed little, if any, peace during the Revolution. 
Serving as the transporter of supplies and men for both 
sides, trains, bridges and track frequently met destruc­
tion at the hands of combatants seeking to prevent them 
from reaching their destinations. As a carrier of 
passengers and precious metals, trains were constantly 
confronted by bandits, rebels and Federales, who sought 
the wealth of their cargos. No railroad company property 
or railroad employee remained safe during the bloody 
struggle. 
30 
Consular Agent Stewart to Lansing, 6 March 1920 
/23419. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CITIES AND TOWNS 
Moving into Mexico after the miners, ranchers, 
railroaders, and farmers came the foreign businessmen, 
anxious to capitalize on the profits to be made during 
the Porfiriato. Merchants, bankers and industrialists 
flocked to the cities and towns to establish their 
businesses, and to build their smelters and plants. 
Coming with them, in most cases, were skilled artisans 
who, when mixed with the unskilled Mexican workers, 
formed the corps of workers for the foreign concerns. 
Because he received many times the wages of the Mexican 
laborer, and found the cost of living very cheap, the 
foreign worker lived very comfortably in Mexico. 
At first, the foreigner found city life much more 
advantageous than that in the country. He had all the 
conveniences, such as stores, doctors, hospitals, thea­
ters and above all. Federal protection from marauding 
bandits, few though they might be during the peace of 
the Porfiriato. The towns and cities proved veritable 
havens for the foreigner, but when the Revolution began, 
the haven turned into a fiery hell. 
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As anarchy prevailed during the struggle, the 
foreigner became easy prey for disgruntled lower class, 
Mexican city dwellers who sought revenge for the infer­
ior status that had been bestowed upon them because of 
the Porfirista preference for foreigners. Rebel and 
bandit groups frequently enriched themselves at the 
expense of foreigners and delighted in committing vicious 
atrocities against them. Throughout the Revolution, 
scores of foreigners died at the hands of Mexicans, 
often being tortured beforehand. When each municipality 
changed from Federal to rebel hands, the foreigner was 
often singled out to die and, as the Revolution progres­
sed, even the Federales sometimes turned upon him. 
Caught in a vise between the contending forces and some­
times unable to leave, foreigners suffered unbearable 
hardships for the duration of the bitter struggle. 
Before the Revolution actually started, foreigners 
in the cities and town had some inkling of what lay in 
store for them. After the burning of Antonio Rodriquez, 
the Mexican lynched in the United States for murdering 
an American woman, an editorial in El Imparcial, a 
Mexico City newspaper, appeared with the evident purpose 
of exciting Mexicans to acts of violence. Cries of 
"Death to the Yankees" and "Down with the Gringos" 
could be heard throughout the nation. In Torreon, 
Coahuila, workers at an American owned Rubber factory 
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openly carried cards reading "Kill Diaz and his Yankee 
friends".^ The anti-foreign sentiment grew rapidly and 
before long, foreigners suffered increasing indignities 
such as being elbowed off of sidewalks and many became 
targets of Mexican insults. As the rebellion progressed 
and Constitutionalist victories increased, foreigners 
in the cities and towns began to feel the burden that 
the Revolution placed upon them. Rebels blockaded cities, 
causing prices to skyrocket, and eventually forced bus­
iness, foreign and native alike, to come to a standstill. 
Fear of riots and destruction of their property permeated 
the soul of every foreigner. Suddenly he felt alone, 
unprotected and hated, as anti-foreign, mostly anti-
American, feelings swept throughout Chihuahua and Coahuila. 
Threats dictated the death of all Americans living in 
Mexico if the United States intervened in Mexican 
2 
affairs. 
Because he faced angry Mexicans inside the cities 
and because he could not circumvent the rebel blockades 
and railroad shut-downs, the foreigner found himself in 
a precarious position. By the end of March, I9II the 
revolutionaries patrolled the entire states of Chihuahua 
1 
Henry Lane Wilson to Knox, 10 November I9IO 
/385; New York Times, 23 November I9IO. 
^New York Times, 3 March I9II; Consul Leonard to 
Knox, undated I9II /993. 
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and Coahuila and up to this point they still strove to 
protect foreign interests. But, in April, the rebels 
began to utilize foreign businesses to their advantage 
as their movement intensified. First to contribute to 
the rebel cause was the Madera Lumber Company in Madera, 
Chihuahua. The rebels completely took over the company's 
machine shops so they could manufacture their cannons 
out of old car axles. The Guggenheim smelter in Chihua­
hua closed down because all of the Mexican workers joined 
3 
the rebels.-'^ 
Throughout April, hope for an early peace faded 
away as business in both states became completely par­
alyzed. But, aside from profit losses, foreign businesses 
suffered very little physical damage. By the end of the 
month, the situation changed drastically. Violently 
anti-American editorials, claiming that United States 
intervention on behalf of foreign investors was imminent, 
spurred rebels and bandits on to violent destruction. 
Insurgents attacked foreign property without regard to 
the character or ownership of property. Law and order 
seemed to vanish as bandits operated freely under the 
^Ellsworth to Knox, 18 March 1911 /1042; Marion 
Letcher to Knox, 6 April 1911 /1318; and New York Times, 
12 April 1911. 
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eyes of the rebels, robbing everyone as they pleased.^ 
In Northern Chihuahua, on May 9, 1911* the 
insurrectos ignited a fire in the business area of Ciudad 
Juarez, completely destroying numerous foreign concerns. 
Following the fire, the rebels embarked on a pillaging 
and looting spree that lasted for hours.^ 
When the Maderista rebels under Villa took Torreon 
on May 13» 1911 the city became a nightmare for hundreds 
of foreigners, especially the Chinese. As the Federal 
forces guarding the city retreated, over 10,000 citizens 
joined the rebels in race riots and property destruc­
tion. Many Chinese victims had their arms and legs tied 
to horses and their bodies torn apart. Some were drag­
ged by the neck, dead and half dead, through the city 
streets. The rebels dragged Doctor J. W. Lim, one of 
the wealthiest Chinese bankers in Northern Mexico, around 
the town plaza until his body was badly crushed. Then 
they shot and killed him. A Mexican mob entered a 
Chinese bank building and found a number of newly 
arrived Chinamen on the second floor. The mob turned on 
them with knifes and guns and then threw them out the 
windows to the street below so other mob members could 
^Letcher to Knox, 11 April 1911 /l^29i; 29 April 
1911 /1430; and New York Times, 19 April 1911* 
^New York Times, 10 May 1911; 15 May 1911. 
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"finish them off". Blood dripping down through the 
bank floor and brains smeared all over the stairwell 
served as grotesque evidence of the Mexican's hatred 
toward the Chinese. The rebels stood little children 
up against a wall and brutally shot them down, despite 
their cries of "No me maten" (Don't kill me). Chinese 
women received the same treatment. Rebels incarcerated 
two hundred Chinese for safekeeping, but while there, 
the Mexican guards took all of their money and clothes. 
Fortunately, they did not lose their lives.^ 
For three hours the slaughter of Chinese and the 
looting of businesses continued. Mexican children, 
eight to ten years of age, strolled through the streets, 
kicking and hitting the dead Chinese in the face and 
then spitting on their corpses. Finally, Emilio Madero, 
Francisco's brother, arrived in Torrecm and stopped the 
killing and plundering. Madero ordered the looting 
stopped "on pain of death." Many of the people began 
bringing back the stolen items and filled a dry irri-
•7 
gation ditch with typewriters and other stolen goods. 
The Chinese did not suffer alone as rebels 
sacked American, Arab, and Spanish stores as well. One 
^Jamieson, Tulitas of Torreon, pp. 119-120} New 
York Times, 22 May 1911; and 23 May 1911. 
9 / 
'Jamieson, Tulitas of Torreon, pp. 121-123. 
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American, Paul C. Renard, had an office on the same 
floor in the Chinese bank building where the Chinese met 
their fate. The Maderistas chopped through the locked 
office stores and took everything that they could move. 
O 
What they could not transport, they destroyed. 
When the ordeal finally ended, 206 Chinese lay 
dead and the Mexicans buried them all together in a 
trench dug outside of the cemetery. Many attributed 
the senseless slaughter of these people to the fact 
that they grew fine vegetables and fruit, which caused 
many Mexicans, not as thrifty or as hard working, to 
cultivate a hatred for them. Another reason put forth 
is that the Chinese bore arms supplied by the Federales 
and fired on the mob when they attempted to rob the 
bank. Whatever the reason, the atrocities committed in 
Torreon set the tempo for many subsequent acts against 
9 
foreigners during the Revolution. 
/ 
Even after Diaz resigned in May 1911* and Madero 
became President in November, the situation still 
remained critical for foreigners as anti-Madero upris­
ings flared-up all over Chihuahua and Coahuila. Anarchy 
Q 
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Tulitas of Torreon, pp. 119-120. 
9 
Carothers to Knox, 19 May 1911 /1895» Ellsworth^ 
to Knox, 2k May 1911 /197^5 Jamieson, Tulitas of Torreon, 
p. 95; and pp. 119-120. 
76 
prevailed everywhere and foreign businessmen quickly 
felt the brunt of the new rebellion. Mexican workers 
in all occupations voiced their complaints against the 
Madero regime and conducted numerous strikes, again 
bringing a halt to business activity. Around Torreon 
alone, 5»000 striking, disgruntled workers posed such 
a potential problem that American and other foreign 
families began to leave the area in anticipation of mob 
violence directed against their property and their 
lives. The Mexican press, still violently anti-American 
in its editorials, kept printing United States interven­
tion articles to intensify the anti-foreign hatred through-
10 
out the country. 
General discontent with Madero, and the Vazquez 
Gomez and Orozco rebellions in early 1912, brought 
increased hardships to foreign investors. Disgruntled 
soldiers staged a barracks revolt in Ju^ez at the end 
of January and looted the town. During the drunken 
frenzy, the soldiers shot two Americans and inflicted 
so much damage on the town that the streets of Juarez 
looked like cyclone damage in Western Kansas. Almost 
every store, curiosity shop, saloon, bordello, and bank 
had its glass front smashed, furniture broken and all 
^^Ellsworth to Knox, 17 November 1911 /25l8j 
21 November 1911 /2562. 
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the contents taken. One French store lost $75»000 in 
goods to the soldiers who also looted a German store 
and then "burned it to the ground. The German owners 
estimated the value of the store and its contents at 
$250,000. American stores received especially harsh 
treatment from the soldiers as American flags placed 
in front of the stores seemed to spur them on to more 
vengeful looting. Anything the soldiers could get 
their hands on they took. Only the Banco Nacional's 
steel vault saved the deposits there from confiscation 
because they could not penetrate the thick walls. 
After the incident, the Chamber of Commerce of 
El Paso, Texas, called upon President Taft to take 
action to protect the lives and the property of American 
citizens in Ju^ez. Taft sent American troops to the 
border, but they saw no action because most foreigners 
11 
had already crossed into Texas for protection. 
Vazquistas and Orozquistas roamed the North, 
preying on foreigners. Vazquistas held up Carlos 
Schmidt, an American employee of the Continental Mexi­
can Rubber Company in Torreon, three times on a 100 
11 
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mile trip he made. His company closed down operations 
because of the rebel seige of Torreon which completely 
paralyzed business. The American Smelting and Refin­
ing Company, robbed nightly, lost over 10,000 pesos 
1 2  
and operated only one of its nine furnaces. 
Residents of Torreo'n suffered as prices rose when 
food supplies dwindled. Eggs, for example, cost thir­
teen cents each, and again hungry Mexicans blamed foreign 
13 
store owners for the high prices. 
Fearing mob action as well as rebel depredations, 
many foreigners throughout both states left. Two hun­
dred and eighty terror stricken Chinese from Goahuila, 
remembered what had happened earlier in Torreon and 
/ 
flocked to Ciudad Porfirio Diaz in hopes of obtaining 
Ik 
asylum in the United States. 
Those foreigners who decided not to abandon 
their property paid heavily for their decision. At 
Santa Rosalia, Chihuahua, Orozquistas under Jose'^ Inez 
Salazar, upon capturing the town, called all the busi­
nesses together, foreign and Mexican alike, and demanded 
contributions to the rebel cause. The rebels forced 
12 
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S. Pearson and Son, a British concern, to donate 11,000 
/ 
pesos and the German-owned Rio Florida Cotton Factory 
contributed 2,000 more. All businesses paid something 
and even an American physician added 500 pesos, under 
duress. In Chihuahua City, the Orozquistas called for 
forced loans amounting to 1,200,000 pesos from members 
of the Chamber of Commerce, banks and merchants of the 
city. The Banco Nacional, run by Frenchmen, delivered 
the entire 275,000 pesos it had in its vaults and then 
closed down. Again, under threats of force and confis­
cations, all businesses contributed. 
Rebels seized whatever they could from businesses 
of all sizes. Luis Hess, an American, owned a shoe 
store in Sierra Mojada, Coahuila. He lost $66o, all 
of his shoes, three horses and most of his other mer­
chandise. Whatever daily cash receipts he made from the 
remaining merchandise he had to turn over to the rebels. 
By the end of May, 1912, the Orozquista movement 
began to wane. In an effort to sustain their struggle, 
the rebels put more pressure on businesses for funds. 
Chihuahua City merchants, already bled dry, were told 
to contribute an even more impossible 1,000,000 pesos. 
All the banks in the city, except one, had closed down 
^^Letcher to Knox, 19 March 1912 /3367» 21 March 
1912 /3525» and Ellsworth to Knox, 17 May 1912 /396^. 
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because of the lack of money. Forced to abandon their 
demands for the total sum, the rebels confronted busi­
nesses individually to extort what they could. The 
American Smelting and Refining forcibly repurchased a 
large quantity of ore that the rebels had stolen from 
them. Refusal presaged a closure of the plant. Two 
months later the company paid $5»000 for the privilege 
of exporting eighteen cars of bullion to the United 
States. 
By October, the Orozquista revolt had ended. Peace 
settled in the cities much faster than in the rural areas 
and businessmen received a brief respite. The long 
struggle proved to be extremely devastating to foreign 
businesses, but had the foreigners abandoned their 
concerns when the uprising first erupted, V^quez Gomez, 
Orozco, and the other anti-Maderistas would not have 
been able to sustain the struggle for as long as they 
did. For, only through the contributions extracted from 
foreign businesses, could the movement endure at any 
length. When this source of income diminished, the 
17 
movement died with it, 
^^Letcher to Knox, 31 May 1912 /4091; 24 June 1912 
/429O; and Ellsworth to Knox, 9 August 1912 /4625. 
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From October, 1912, to February, 1913» businesses 
attempted reconstruction. However, with the Huerta coup 
that replaced Madero in February, Chihuahua and Coahuila 
burst forth in anti-Huerta rebellions and again business 
/ 
paid the rebel bills. In Cuidad Porfirio Diaz, Coahuila, 
Venustiano Carranza's brother. Colonel Jesus Carranza, 
demanded that the foreign merchants raise ten to twenty 
thousand pesos to pay and feed the State volunteers. 
Colonel Carranza prevented all foreigners, except Ameri­
cans from leaving the city so he could collect the 
money. However, foreign concerns refused to donate 
even one dollar to him. Carranza took the refusal in 
stride and calmly confiscated over 100 car loads of 
merchandise destined to the merchants from the Mexican 
customs house. Carranza then sold much of the goods 
at prices so low that Mexicans, unable to buy shoes 
before, strutted through town wearing the best brands. 
All of the goods sold brought less than one half of its 
wholesale value. To receive the remaining goods, the 
foreign merchants paid heavy ransoms to the Constitu­
tionalists. Carranza*s demands did not stop at the 
customs office. He ordered all foreigners to pay rent 
directly to him instead of to their landlords. To 
prevent any retaliation, he also demanded that all 
foreigners deposit their arms and ammunition with him. 
Faced with threats of destruction and confiscation, the 
82 
1 ft 
foreigners complied with Carranza's demands. 
Jesus Carranza*s actions in Cuidad Porfirio 
/ 
Diaz complemented the activities of his brother in the 
interior of Coahuila. Governor Venustiano Carranza 
pilfered all of the state public funds and supplemented 
them by making heavy demands on banks and merchants 
throughout the state. Carranza seized the railroad 
cars of the Continental Rubber Company and sold them 
to a German rubber msinufacturing firm at Monclavo. The 
German firm then shipped the goods on to New York to 
sell. Many businesses in Coahuila lost large amounts 
of goods to the rebels, ''legally confiscated", accord­
ing to Carranza, because the goverment in charge of 
in 
the State needed the goods to sustain their efforts. ^ 
Once again, businesses in both states fell victim 
to demands of bandits as well as rebels. One bandit, 
Maclovio Herrera, and his ̂ 00 followers sacked the town 
of Naica, Chihuahua, robbed all the stores and resi­
dences sind held an Italian businessman, Jose^Bovio, 
until they received a ransom of $2,000. Herrera and 
i 
his band also entered the camp of workmen building the 
__ 
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Conchos River Dam and demanded $25*000 under threat of 
death to the English foreman. The manager, J. W. Fuller, 
an American, refused the bandits demands so Herrera 
ordered him tied to a burro and threatened to send the 
burro down a steep mountain side. Fuller's associates 
quickly offered Herrera $5,000, but he refused to take 
less than $10,000, which he received. Not satisfied with 
just the $10,000, the bandits looted the homes of all 
the foreign workers and then robbed the company store 
of $7,000 in merchandise. The experience proved to be 
most frustrating to Fuller's associates, who had paid 
$20,000 to free him from another group of bandits just 
20 
two weeks before the Herrera episode. 
As the rebel movement engulfed Chihuahua and 
Coahuila, business activity again came to a standstill. 
In Torreon, smelters and factories closed their doors 
leaving thousands unemployed. Many of the destitute 
Mexican workers joined the growing rebel army and vented 
their revenge against foreign concerns as they went.^^ 
The lack of business activity worked tremendous 
hardships on foreigners in Torreon. Many wanted to 
leave, but could not obtain enough money to do so. Most 
had so little funds that Henry Lane Wilson sent $1,000 
^^New York Times, 15 April 1913» 1? April 1913* 
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to Consul George Carothers to buy food for them. 
City after city fell to the onslaught of either 
rebels or bandits. Sweeping through the North with 
devastating success, the rebels spared no one in their 
quest for victory. At Saltillo, the rebels annihilated 
a Federal garrison and then turned their energies on 
the town where they looted and destroyed foreign busi-
/ 
nesses and homes. In Ciudad Porfirio Diaz, the rebels 
completely destroyed a Chinese laundry and arrested 
fourteen Chinese, claiming the Chinese fired on them 
first from inside of the building.^3 
Bandits, too, joined the rebels in a reign of 
terror as they invaded the town of Madera, Chihuahua, 
in search of a posse of American cowboys who had killed 
two of their band. The bandits, in the unsuccessful 
process of trying to reach the cowboys who had barri­
caded themselves in a hotel, terrorized other Americans 
in town. They rode through the streets, looted Ameri­
can homes, threatened to burn the American lumber 
companies there, and to kill all the men and take the 
women for ransom. They abducted two American lumber­
men and held them for ransom. Another American, John 
^^New York Times, 13 July 1913-
^^John Silliman to Bryan, 21 May 1913 /756B; 
Ellsworth to Bryan, 28 May I9I3 /762k .  
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Parks, had his left ear severed and his face slashed 
by a bandit's sabre. The assault on Parks, brought on 
by his refusal to give money to the bandits, was wit­
nessed by his wife and children. 
An American Congressman, William R. Smith of 
Texas, wanted Woodrow Wilson to send troops to Madera 
to protect the Americans, but Wilson told Smith that 
Pancho Villa, still courting United States aid, would 
protect Americans there. The force Villa sent to Madera 
successfully chased the bandits away from the Americans, 
but a few days later a Federal force routed the Villis-
tas and then arrested five American officers of the 
Madera Lumber Company for being Constitutionalist 
sympathizers.25 
The Madera Lumber Company's troubles did not end 
yet. In August, bandits under M^imo Castillo took 
1,200 pesos from the company's safe, then, a week later, 
they kidnapped G. Duthe, the American manager of the 
power plant until the company paid a large ransom. Later 
on in August, the Castillo band murdered Edmond Hayes, 
the manager of the company. Castillo's men, affiliated 
with Huerta's Federal forces, had not been paid for 
^^New York Times, 20 July 1913; 23 July 1913» and 
July 1913. 
^^New York Times, 24 July 1913; 6 August 1913* 
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some time. To appease the bandits, the Federales allowed 
them to loot for twenty-four hours. Hayes died as a 
result of this action because he refused Castillo's 
demand for money. After this occurrence, most of the 
100 Americans, along with several Germans and seventy-
five Chinese departed for the United States.^^ 
Federal activities imposed additional hardships 
/ 
on foreigners. In beleaguered Torreon, Federales took 
food from Americans and gave it to the soldiers. Since 
the rebels had cut off the food supply lines, civilians 
received just enough food to sustain life and the rest 
went to the soldiers. Torreon seethed with epidemics 
of smallpox, scarlatina and typhus. Sanitary conditions 
were almost nonexistant as pestilance from dead humans, 
horses, and mules crept into the city. Still, Federales 
denied foreigners the right to leave. However, Frank 
and Milton Chessam and Andrew Odel, ignored the Federal 
orders and escaped from the death trap. The three 
/ 
Americans procured mules from the area around Torreon 
and rode 600 miles to Piedras Negras.^"^ 
Some foreigners not as fortunate as the Chessams 
and Odel suffered immeasurably. Federales under General 
Bravo executed six Americans in August, claiming they 
26 
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supported the Constitutionalists. Carothers protested 
to Bravo, who told him that the affair was none of his 
business. Bravo felt that since the United States did 
not recognize the Huerta government, he would not recog-
pQ 
nize Carother's authority. 
Federales harassed other foreigners besides 
those in Torreon. In all the cities in Chihuahua and 
Coahuila still controlled by Huerta, foreign companies 
and individuals forcibly contributed large amounts of 
money to the Federal troops stationed there. Some 
American companies paid several thousand pesos per week 
for Federal "protection". Managers of the companies 
would not make statements in this regard to Washington 
2Q 
officials from fear of Federal retribution. ^ 
Foreign investors not only contributed money to 
the Federales. but also contributed manpower. Many 
concerns closed down because their Mexican labor force 
was conscripted into the Federal Army. The Guggenheim 
property in Chihuahua City, alone, lost almost all of 
its ^,000 native laborers because the Federales needed 
them to bolster their forces in the struggle against 
the Villistas in Chihuahua. 
28 
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Parral, Chihuahua, greatly resembled Torre<^ 
during the fall of 1913* When the Constitutionalists 
took the city, they levied forced loans on all foreigners. 
There, too, foreigners faced starvation as food supplies 
became exhausted and what did exist, first went to the 
Constitutionalist soldiers. Natives boycotted American 
businesses and spent absolutely no money at American 
stores if the Mexican's could buy the needed items from 
31 
the Germans, French, or any other foreigner.^ 
In October, 1913» "the rebels took Torreon, but 
instead of relief, foreigners faced added burdens. Upon 
entering the city, the Villistas demanded a 3 million 
peso "loan" from everyone (except Americans) in the 
district. Three weeks after their initial entrance into 
Torreon, the Villistas had executed twenty-six Spaniards 
who refused to meet their monetary demands. Villa, 
however, did allow foreigners to leave once they ful­
filled their monetary obligations.^^ 
At Ju^ez, Villa again became displeased with the 
Spanish, this time because they would not accept his 
fiat money, and because they closed their doors and 
refused to deal with him. Spanish property escaped 
^^New York Times, ^ September 1913* 
^^Silliman to Bryan, 25 October 1913 /9311» ^ 
November 1913 /96l4; and 29 November 1913 /9983* 
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confiscation only because American consul Thomas Edwards 
accepted custody of it, and Villa refused to challenge 
United States authority.This refusal, however, did 
not necessarily extend to American business concerns. 
While still in Ju^ez, Villa swore he would bar the 
Western Union Telegraph Company from Mexico for their 
refusal to do business with him. Villa maintained 
that this action came about because the company had an 
agreement with Huerta, whereby it would not operate in 
rih, 
rebel-held territory.-^ 
Villa announced in December that he would give 
full protection to all foreigners who remained neutral 
in Mexican political affairs. Those who had given any 
support at all to the Huerta administration would have 
their property confiscated. In Chihuahua City, he 
carried out this pledge. As a reprisal against mer­
chants, mostly Spanish, for not accepting his fiat 
money. Villa confiscated $100,000 worth of merchandise 
from the Banco Minero. Spanish merchants closed their 
shops down and gave the keys to Consul Edwards again. 
But, this time, Villistas did challenge Edwards author­
ity when they broke into the Spanish shops and looted 
them. Edwards returned the keys to the Spanish because 
33 
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he could not protect the property. Villa sold most of 
the confiscated stock to the poor Mexicans in Chihua-
hua.35 
Villa's hatred for the Spanish became quite 
evident in Chihuahua City. Not only did he confiscate 
their goods and extract $1,500,000 in gold from them, 
but he ordered them out of the state within ten days, 
under penalty of death. Villa also assailed Spanish 
nuns and priests as he confiscated their property and 
demanded $5>000 from each of the priests. 
As of December 21, 1913» Villa had confiscated 
all of the property of Spanish subjects in Chihuahua. 
The property amounted to millions of dollars and since 
most of the mercantilist establishments and some of the 
factories belonged to Spaniards, the commerce of Chi­
huahua City crumbled. Villa did not limit his demands 
to just Spanish. He also seized a department store, 
valued at $1,500,000, owned jointly by French, German, 
English and Spanish interests and placed a rebel leader. 
General Manuel Chao in charge of it. He also seized 
400 tons of coal from the American Smelting and Refining 
Company. The loss of the coal, added to the large 
35 
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forced loan that Huerta exacted from the company 
earlier, presaged the closure of the company's plants 
37 
in Chihuahua. 
By the end of 1913* Villa had seized over $5*000, 
000 dollars in foreign property. He justified all of 
his actions when he declared that the property belonged 
to the poor. Thanks to Villa, the rebel war fund increased 
tremendously at the expense of dozens of frightened for­
eign investors, many of whom fled from Mexico.^® 
Saltillo, Coahuila, began 1914 in much the same 
condition as Torreon and Chihuahua City. Rebels cut 
off all supplies of food and communications to the city 
and as a result, food prices rose. Coffee, which earlier 
sold for ninety cents per kilo now cost three pesos. 
Merchants, forced to raise prices because of the shortage, 
were violently chastized by the Mexican press and anti-
foreign sentiment grew once again. General Maass, the 
Federal commander, collected 40,000 pesos from the banks 
and merchants for what he called his "reserve fund" to 
buy prime necessity items. Because of the conditions, 
some businesses closed down rather than accept government 
script, which would be worthless if the rebels captured 
37 
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the city. The incarceration of the manager of a Syrian 
concern because he refused to accept the script, con­
vinced many merchants how foolish it would be to remain 
open for business if they did not accept the government's 
39 money. 
After the Americans occupied Veracruz in April, 
191^» anti-American sentiment in Saltillo increased. 
Federales incarcerated a number of Americans and civil­
ian mobs formed throughout the town shouting "Muerto los 
gringos", "Death to the gringos". The American Consul, 
John R. Silliman, and an American physician. Dr. Herbert 
Saunders, were among those jailed. Saunders, a retired 
United States Army surgeon, spent fifteen days in jail. 
The Federales searched Saunders and confiscated his 
watch, money, and hat as soon as he arrived at the jail. 
During the ordeal, the jailers struck Saunders several 
times, threw him down two flights of cement stairs and 
finally locked him up in a cell three feet square. Water 
and filth covered the cell floor and Saunders did not 
have any bedding. He remained there for twenty-four 
hours before he received some foul-smelling soup and 
dirty water. The Federales forced Silliman to divulge 
the combination to the safe at the consulate. They then 
^^Silliman to Bryan, 12 January 191^ /10633» 
4 March 191^ /11139. 
93 
opened the safe, took all of his valuables and important 
papers, including the American code book. Besides the 
incarceration and harrassment doled out to the Americans, 
the Federales also looted and burned the Purcell Bank 
and Mazapil Copper Company, British concerns. The 
cashier of the bank and three employees at the copper 
company died in the robberies. The Federales then moved 
to the German owned Seiber Hardware Store, one of the 
biggest in Mexico, and looted it.^° 
In April, Villa returned to Torreon. While lay­
ing seige to the city. Villa forced the British Vice-
consul at Torreo'n, H. S. Cunard - Cummings, to enter 
Torreon and demand the surrender of the Federales under 
Velasco. Villa told Cunard - Cummings that if he did 
not go, he would have his brains blown out. Villa almost 
sent George C. Carothers, the American Consul, but decided 
instead that Velasco knew Cunard - Cummings better. Upon 
taking possession of the city. Villa rounded up all the 
Spanish into three buildings. He uncharacteristically 
told them that he would not kill them because he did not 
want foreign nations to call him an assassin. However, 
he said that they must be expelled for their own protec­
tion because his men, violently anti-Spanish, would kill 
them if they had a chance. Therefore, six hundred Spanish 
^^New York Times, 30 April 191^; 23 May 191^ 
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residents left Torreon on a special train that Villa 
provided. The Spaniards left behind $15*000,000 worth 
of cotton and Villa immediately sent $1,000,000 of it 
to El Paso. 
When Huerta resigned in July, 1914 and Villa 
and Carranza struggled for power, foreign business 
received another setback. To finance their campaigns, 
they both resorted to large forced loans and other mea­
sures from which foreigners could not escape. 
Merchants in Chihuahua constantly felt the wrath 
of Villa. In July, 1915» Villa called a meeting of all 
the merchants in Chihuahua City and accused them of 
robbing the people. From that point on, he said he 
would take drastic measures to keep the merchants from 
selling at extortion prices. He seized all the stocks 
of merchandise in the city, native and foreign alike. 
Foreigners were to be paid cost plus fifteen per cent 
for their goods, but native merchants contributed 
everything for the good of the Revolution. Villistas 
looted all the stores and then distributed the goods 
to the city's poor. He forced all foreign merchants to 
accept his money at thirty cents on the dollar and 
41 
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hp 
ordered them to raise a forced loan of $300,000 gold. 
Villa became extremely belligerent toward Ameri­
cans after the United States recognized Carranza in the 
Fall of 1915* Bandits kidnapped an American employee 
of the Madera Lumber Company for a ransom of $10,000 
gold, but when the Company sent the money to save the 
man's life, the Villistas intercepted the agents carry­
ing the ransom and confiscated it, sealing the man's 
doom. Villistas also arrested James Brennerman, manager 
/ 
of the Santa Rosalia Smelter of the Guggenheim interests 
in Chihuahua. Two weeks later. Villa confiscated the 
kT 
whole plant and operated it for the rebel cause. ̂  
As the year came to a close. Villa moved back 
into Chihuahua City once again and demanded more food 
and money from the foreign merchants. Some of the mer­
chants refused his demands, so his men looted and destroyed 
many of the stores. From Chihuahua City, the Villistas 
moved back to Madera, where they held thirty American 
employees of the Madera Lumber Company until the Company 
paid the 500,000 peso forced loan Villa levied against 
them. After they left the lumber company, the Villistas 
k2 
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looted and destroyed American homes throughout the town. 
Many Americans, forewarned of Villa's coming, left the 
town, narrowly missing being killed by Villa and his 
troops, who pursued them for miles before giving up the 
chase. The bitter Villa declared that he would destroy 
American property every chance he had and that no Ameri-
can was safe in territory he controlled. 
Problems for foreigners arose from other quarters 
after the Pershing Expedition entered Mexico in search 
of Villa. Anti-American sentiment in the cities pre­
saged mob violence, directed mainly at American merchants. 
A mob in Torreon, yelling "Viva Villa", looted five 
stores, two railroad cars of sugar, one of corn and one 
of potatoes. Merchants quickly bought up all available 
com and sold it at cost to alleviate the situation 
before more rioting occurred. Later, a mob, led by the 
mayor of Torres, converged on the American consulate, 
destroyed all the furniture inside and extensively 
damaged the building. In a meeting in the town Plaza 
at the end of the rioting, the mayor urged the populace 
4*1 
to run all Americans out of the country. 
Hungry citizens in Parral, Chihuahua looted 
New York Times, 14 December 1915? 15 December 1915. 
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stores and warehouses in Parral and in other towns in 
the area. Carrancista forces, witnessed the mob action, 
but refused to intervene on behalf of the merchants, 
In Chihuahua City, anti-American rioters stoned 
foreign homes and businesses and in Piedras Negras, 
Coahuila (formerly Ciudad Profirio Diaz), rioters paraded 
through the streets carrying large placards which called 
upon all Mexicans to take up arms to defend their nation. 
In Saltillo, mobs of women from the lower classes stoned 
and sacked foreign stores that closed down because of 
4? 
the conditions. 
The Mexican press added fuel to the flame of 
\mrest by publishing anti-American articles. One such 
article said that Mexicans in Texas had revolted and 
were burning bridges and defeating American forces. The 
article, though untrue, still managed to inspire many 
Mexicans. The situation, completely out of hand, forced 
many Americans to leave. But, some Americans feared for 
their safety in traveling, and remained in Mexico. This 
fear was well grounded by Mexican mobs who milled around 
i|-6 
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railroad stations, chanting "Murder Americans."^® 
Villa curtailed his activities during most of 
the Punitive Expedition, but by November, 1916, he 
returned to action. After he took the area around 
/ 
Santa Rosalia, Chihuahua, a Villista officer, General 
Uribe, accused all foreigners of being enemies of Villa's 
cause and ordered them all shot. The Villistas executed 
a number of Chinese and Arab residents and one American, 
Doctor Fisher. Uribe gave the prisoners the choice of 
either having their ears severed from their head or 
execution. Many of the prisoners chose death rather 
than mutilation. After the executions, Uribe and his 
men looted the whole town.^^ 
y 
From Santa Rosalia, the Villistas turned to 
Parral where Villa turned extremely barbaric after 
taking the city. He issued a manifesto which stated 
that he planned to confiscate all American property 
and that he would kill any American or Mexican who 
worked for American companies. He also ordered the 
execution of a German merchant, Theodore Hoemuller, 
and his wife and baby. The German aroused Villa's 
anger because he displayed 18 pairs of ears and a letter 
UR 
Cobb to Lansing, 10 June 1916 /18376j Blocker 
to Lansing 16 June I9I6 
^^New York Times, 5 November I9I6. 
99 
containing insulting epithets addressed to Villa. The 
ears had been severed from Carranza soldiers and a 
Carrancista General placed them in Hoemuller*s store 
window. Villa ordered the ears severed from the 
Carrancistas so he could recognize them the next time 
they met. The Villistas also castrated some of the 
Carrancista officers. Villa's acts of vicious brutal­
ity increased as he executed all the remaining foreigners 
in Parral and then murdered over 200 Chinese, many of 
whom had businesses between Parral and Jimenez. 
Early in December, 1916, the Villistas returned 
to Chihuahua City. Villa warned all the residents not 
to hide foreigners because he planned to kill them all, 
confiscate all their property, and give it to the Mexi­
can people. Villistas looted foreigners* homes and 
businesses, carried off what they could and burned the 
rest. The bandits loaded two full trains with the loot 
they took from the stores in the city. Villa also 
demanded 1,000,000 pesos from the residents, which he 
received, or he would burn the town. Scores of China­
men and Mexicans perished and the bodies were strewn 
L. C. Neale, Attorney for the American Smelting 
and Refining Company, to Lansing, 1? November I916 /I9898; 
Blocker to Lansing, 18 November I9I6 /1990?; /1993^; New 
York Times, 1? November 1916; 19 November I916; and 20 
November I916. 
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all over the city.^^ 
Villa turned from Chihuahua City back to Torreon 
and by the last part of December, he took the town. Dur­
ing his stay there, his men murdered sixty Chinese, five 
Arabs and eighty Carranza sympathizers. Many bodies 
remained in the street for over two weeks. Villa con­
fiscated 150 cars of merchandise from merchants and 
industrial plants, and levied a $100,000 forced loan 
on the inhabitants. The Villistas left no hiding place 
unchecked in their search for Americans. British sub­
jects saved their lives only by providing birth certi­
ficates that proved they were not Americans. Villa 
entered the town with 2,000 men, but left with somewhere 
between 5»000 to 10,000 as many former Villistas joined 
up with him again. Villa abandoned the 150 cars of 
merchandise he took when he ran out of coal to run his 
train a few miles North of the town.^^ 
From 1917 to 1920, Villa seemed to enjoy complete 
freedom to come and go wherever he wanted. In fact, 
in 1918 he blew up the gas plant, engines and smelter 
of a $500,000 American power plant only to show the 
United States that Carranza could not guarantee his 
^^New York Times, 2 December I916; 8 December 
1916; and 12 December I916. 
<2 
Blocker to Lansing, 10 January 191? /20248; 12 
January 1917 /20260j and 17 January 1917 
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earlier promises to protect foreigners and their pro­
perty. Although his movement lost its momentum. Villa 
periodically would retake a town and put pressure on 
the businessmen and foreigners. Such was the case in 
March, 1919 when the Villistas entered Pearson, Chihua­
hua, killed three Chinamen, robbed several stores of 
over $30,000 worth of merchandise and robbed several 
Americans of their money, jewelry, clothing and horses. 
The amazing part of this episode lay in the fact that 
the Villistas did not kill the Americans. The vengeance 
of Villa had definitely mellowed toward Americans by 
this time. When Villa and his band raided Muzquiz, Coa-
huila. Villa kidnapped an American, Frederick G. Hugo, 
but released him without receiving any of the $10,000 
ransom he asked for. Hugo became so fascinated with 
Villa that he invited him home for Christmas dinner. 
Villa finally made his peace with everyone in 
July, 1920, but just for old times* sake, on his way 
to his retirement plantation, he stopped off long 
enough in Sabinas, Coahuila to steal 80 horses from 
American ranches in the vicinity and to obtain a forced 
loan of 30,000 pesos to pay his troops. 
^^Fall Committee Report, I1IO96; Edward Dow to 
Lansing, 13 March 1919 /2256O; New York Times, I6 
December 1919? and 18 December 1919* 
^^Blocker to State Department, 31 July 1920 /2^415. 
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The death and destruction of the Revolution was 
much more pronounced in the cities than in the rural 
areas. Victimized by Mexican city dwellers, rebels, 
bandits and Federales, foreigners were often trapped in 
the cities and forced to endure the hardships of hunger, 
pestilence and disease. Events such as the Pershing 
Expedition and the United States intervention at Vera­
cruz brought more hardships as Mexicans took out their 
anti-American hatred on those living amongst them. 
Pancho Villa viciously treated all foreigners 
during the Revolution, but to say that he alone bore 
the responsibility for the foreigners' plight is not 
true. Federales imposed many hardships on them, and 
Carranza, especially, made life miserable for foreigners 
in the city. He forced them to accept his worthless 
money, under threat of death, and levied forced loans 
against them so he could pay off his troops and aid the 
needy. 
Bandits and Mexican mobs meant more danger to the 
foreigner. Living in the peace of the city while the 
Revolution fermented in the rural areas, the foreigner 
felt rather safe. But, as the Revolution intensified 
and as each contending faction swept through the cities 
seeking money, materials and revenge, the foreigner 
found himself living in a "deathtrap". 
CHAPTER V 
FOREIGNERS, THE LAW, AND TAXATION 
Besides the physical depredations imposed upon 
them by Mexicans, foreigners in Mexico were also sub­
jected to a number of special laws and decrees that 
placed added burdens on their shoulders. The rulings 
mostly affected the mining industry, but, foreign 
merchants, ranchers and railroadmen also suffered from 
the effects of the numerous laws and decrees promulgated 
by various individuals during the Revolution. 
Reaction to foreign control of Mexican riches 
appeared very evident before the Revolution began. The 
Mine Law of 1910, effective as of January 1, 1910, 
resulted from anti-foreign agitation beginning as early 
as 1904, Articles 141 through 1^3 of the new law pro­
vided that prior permission must be given to any for­
eigner or joint foreign-Mexican enterprise before they 
could hold mining property in the border states. The 
days of the foreign miner moving to Mexico and staking 
out a claim, without consulting Mexican officials, had 
ceased.^ 
1 
Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry 1890-1950, 
pp. 78-79. 
103 
104 
/ / 
With the removal of Diaz, Abraham Gonzalez, 
Governor of Chihuahua, issued a decree designed to 
/ 
rescind some of the privileges that Diaz had given to 
foreign investors. The decree stated that foreign con­
cessions which might have been regarded as monopolies 
/ 
would not be extended or renewed. Gonzalez also ordered 
that every legal effort be made to restrict all foreign 
monopolies that currently existed in Chihuahua. The 
Governor further decreed that every property owner, 
Mexican and foreign alike, would pay taxes to rebel 
officials. The new decree forced foreigners who owned 
cattle ranches, mines or lumber companies to pay customs 
on exports as well. From that point on, foreign capital 
would have to compete with Mexican capital in quest of 
government concessions. Since American, German and 
British interests controlled most of the properties, 
the business scene took on a new look.^ 
Mining companies in Chihuahua and Coahuila faced 
/ 
more trouble after Gonzalez*decree. As the Orozco 
rebellion unfolded, Orozco's forces collected the mine 
taxes that the miners normally paid to the Federal 
Government. Under Mexican law, if the miners were one 
month late on their taxes, they paid a fine of 50 per 
2 
New York Times, 16 June 1911? Beezley, Insurgent 
Governor, p. 62. 
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cent of the tax. Being two months late cost a 100 per 
cent fine and after three months tardiness, the title 
to their property reverted back to the Government. The 
American Department of State advised the miners to pay 
the taxes to Orozco and to obtain a receipt for them. 
The Department then sent word to Madero that they 
regarded the payment of taxes to Orozco as completely 
fulfilling all tax obligations. Madero agreed to this 
policy, alleviating the miners* predicament for the 
time being. 
The problem of double taxation arose again during 
Huerta*s reign. The Constitutionalists forced the min­
ers to pay taxes to them because Carranza refused to 
recognize receipts of taxes paid to the Federal Govern­
ment. Once again, the miners did not know to whom they 
should pay taxes. Many miners, more fearful of the Huerta 
regime than they were of Madero*s, paid double taxes to 
protect their property titles. They paid the taxes even 
though the United States Department advised Huerta that 
the miners* tax obligation had been fulfilled when they 
3 
paid their taxes to the Constitutionalists. 
L. Wilson to Knox, 21 August 1912, 812.512/5? 
J. W. Austin, Mine owner, to Bryan, 7 July 1913» 812.512/ 
51; J. B. Moore, for Bryan, to Austin, 18 July 1913» 812. 
512/51* Memorandum from U.S. Department of State, 30 
August 1913* 812.512/83^; and Bernstein, The Mexican 
Mining Industry I89O-I950# p. I06. 
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The chaotic conditions of the Constitutionalist 
rebellion forced the closure of many foreign mining 
concerns and Carranza exacerbated the foreigners* plight 
when he decreed in April, 1913* that it constituted a 
felony for foreigners to close down their mines or mills. 
Carranza*3 assertion revolved around the fact that the 
closures definitely demonstrated the miners* sympathy 
for the Huerta Government. The miners then, reluctantly 
continued operations, even in the face of rebel and 
bandit incursions. Protection from the dissident ele­
ments fell upon the mine owners themselves, but when 
Carranza decreed that all foreigners possessing fire­
arms after May 21, 1913» would receive a ten year jail 
sentence, the miners lost their only means of protec-
4 
tion. 
Carranza did not limit his taxes to just mining 
concerns. In February, 1914, he raised the cattle 
export taxes in areas controlled by the Constitutional­
ists, Ranchers paid an additional eight pesos per head 
to export calves, twelve pesos for cattle one (1) year 
old, sixteen pesos for steers two (2) years and over, 
and an additional twenty pesos for each bull and cow 
over two (2) years old. Carranza used the extra money 
4 
New York Times, 26 April 1913; Ellsworth to 
Bryan, 29 May 1913 /7646. 
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brought in by the tax increase to purchase more arms 
and ammunition.^ 
In May, 1914, Carranza took a firmer stand 
against the foreign mine owners around Parral, Chihua­
hua who had shut down operations. A new decree stated 
that unless the owners return to the district within 
fifteen days and resume operations of their properties, 
their mines would be confiscated and operated for the 
benefit of the Mexican people. By August, Carranza had 
confiscated a number of unworked properties throughout 
Chihuahua, and those that he did not confiscate had 
their taxes doubled. Also in August, with Huerta deposed, 
Carranza voided all mine titles that had been registered 
by Huerta. Those who had received titles from Huerta 
had to reapply for new titles from the Carranza Govern­
ment. Carranza also stated that Huerta's tax laws would 
be replaced by a forthcoming new tax program.^ 
When Villa began his struggle against Carranza, 
both sides needed revenue to sustain their armies. To 
the mine owners fell most of the financial burden of 
keeping Carranza*s forces in the field since his new 
^611.127/32, Taken from the El Paso Times, 15 
February 1914. 
^New York Times, 15 May 1914; 7 August 1914; and 
Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry I890-I950, p. 
107. 
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mining law doubled the export taxes on ores and metals. 
He placed the taxes on an absolute rather than on an 
ad valorem basis and if the miners missed three install­
ments, he automatically concelled the titles to their 
mines. The tax intended not only to collect more money, 
but also to force production by making idleness too 
costly because taxes had to be paid whether the mine 
7 
operated or not. 
Carranza kept the pressure on the mine owners 
into 1916, and on May 1, he dealt them a crusing blow 
with a new massive tax program. The new program levied 
taxes on the basis of the number of claims that one had, 
and since most foreigners, especially Americans, had 
over 2,500 acres of claims, the program proved devasta­
ting. On gold and silver mines the tax was $6 a year 
for each claim if one had 1 to 10 claims, $12 a year if 
one had 11 to 50 claims, $18 a year for 51 to 100 claims 
and $2^ a year if one had 101 claims or more. For 
mines bearing non-precious metals, the tax called for 
$6 a year for each claim if one had 1 to 50 claims, $12 
a year for 51 to 200 claims, $18 a year for 201 to 500 
claims and $24 a year on each claim if one had 50I 
claims or more. The new law also imposed a ten per cent 
"^Letcher to Bryan, 3 March 1915» 812.512/57^? 
Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry I890-I950, pp. 
109-110. 
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export tax ad valorem on gold and silver and a five per 
cent export tax on other minerals. Carranza designed 
his program to force people to stake out a small number 
of claims that would be worked, and to discourage the 
holding of large tracts of land, held only for specula­
tion purposes.® 
Carranza, in I9I6, also ordered all foreign 
factories to quadruple the wages they paid their Mexican 
laborers and to pay them three months wages if they 
closed down, but clearly, his attention focused mainly 
on the mine owners. A serious crises confronted the 
owners during the Pershing Expedition when Carranza, 
angry with the miners because of their support of the 
expedition, imposed additional laws on them. Under the 
new laws, foreigners intent on securing any concessions 
in Mexico had to renounce, in advance, appeals to their 
own governments, under penalty of forfeiture. Foreigners, 
once they received a concession, had to operate it con­
tinuously for the concession to remain in force. For­
eign owners also could not apply for a concession unless 
they "nationalized" themselves and held their property 
through a Mexican subsidiary and filed an affadavit to 
New York Times, 2 May I916; 14 September I9l6j 
and Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry I89O-I950, 
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9 
that effect. 
The new laws soon became part of the Mexican Con­
stitution of 1917, a revolutionary document that had a 
tremendous impact on all foreign investors in Mexico. 
Carranza, in September I9I6, called for a constitutional 
convention to bring the Mexican Constitution up to date 
and to embody the goals that the Revolution had achieved. 
Parts of the Constitution, written in December, I9I6, 
and put into effect on February 5» 191?» had promised 
to "give Mexico back to the Mexicans", Various sections, 
chiefly Articles 2?, 28, 33 and 123, severely limited 
the activities of foreigners in Mexico. 
The first of these. Article 27, strove to remove 
/ 
one of the Diaz acts which allowed foreigners to acquire 
property because it declared the State to be the original 
and sole owner of all lands, waters, and subsoil wealth. 
The laws put forth by Carranza during the Summer of I9I6, 
relating to who could receive concessions, also found 
their way into this Article. Furthermore, Article 27 
prohibited foreigners from owning land within thirty 
miles of the Mexican coastline and sixty miles of the 
border. The Mexican Government also had the right to 
expropriate foreign owned properties, but they had to 
9 
Gerhardt, England and The Mexican Revolution 
I9IO-I920, p. ̂ 23; Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Indus-
try 1890-1950. pp. 111-113. 
Ill 
10 
pay appropriate compensation for them. 
Article 28 of the Constitution ended all the 
specific exemptions from taxation which the Diaz Admin­
istration had so generously bestowed upon some foreigners 
and foreign owned companies. 
According to Article 33» foreigners possessed 
rights like Mexican citizens. But, the President had 
the right to deport any foreigner without benefit of a 
prior trial or judgement if the foreigner proved to be 
troublesome. This Article also prohibited foreigners 
12 
from interfering in Mexican political affairs. 
The last of the four articles, number 123, struck 
at the labor problem. Mexican laborers received an 
eight-hour work day, a six-day week, minimum wage', equal 
pay for equal work and the right to organize unions and 
to strike.^3 
Carranza considered many of the provisions of 
the Constitution to be too radical, far exceeding his 
proposals, so he ignored most of it. However, the Con­
stitution gradually became a reality to Mexicans and 
^^Atkin, Revolution!, pp. 298-299. 
^^Gerhardt, England and The Mexican Revolution 
1910-1920, p. 446. 
^^New York Times, 3 February 1917• 
^^Atkin, Revolution!» p. 299. 
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with its implementation, the foreigner became constitu­
tionally controlled and his favored position disappeared. 
To live, work and own property in Mexico, he had to 
become "Mexicanized" 
After the Constitution went into effect, mine 
owners found no immediate relief from Carranza. On 
February, 1917* Carranza ordered all non-operating mines 
that had not filed acceptable reasons for their dormancy 
to be confiscated by the Mexican Government. Mexican 
cities added more tax burdens to the miners when in 
April they demanded payment of local taxes. These new 
taxes, coupled with the Federal Government's doubling 
of the stamp tax on export minerals in December, 1917, 
created even more hardships. Fortunately, by mid 1918, 
Carranza began to mellow as he permitted all mining 
machinery and parts to be admitted duty free to Mexico. 
The New Tax Law of 1918, lowered the rates set in 1916 
and decreased the penalties for non-working mines. Car­
ranza also eased the restrictions on those foreigners 
seeking new concessions. Furthermore, in 1919* he 
decreased taxes on precious metals and made concessions 
to those delinquent in their tax payments. To encourage 
resumption of operations, miners could pay all their 
Gerhardt, England and The Mexican Revolution 
1910-1920, pp. 437-438; New York Times, 3 February 1917» 
113 
taxes for the years preceding 1919» installment for 
installment with their current taxes and without penalty* 
Outside of Carranza's refusal to return any of the pro­
perty confiscated from mine owners who resided abroad 
during I9I9, and therefore had no legal rights in Mexico, 
Carranza finally began to "ease off" the foreign mine 
owner. 
The foreign investor in Mexico before the Revolu­
tion had numerous advantages over the native Mexicans, 
but as the struggle progressed, he eventually saw those 
advantages fade away. As one warring faction and then 
another controlled an area, owners either had to pay 
taxes to both sides or face having their property con­
fiscated. The threat of confiscation also hovered over 
their heads if they did not continue operating their 
concerns, even though war conditions made it economically 
unfeasible and extremely dangerous to do so. Delegated 
to the role of financing much of the long struggle, the 
foreign investor, paying out increased taxes and wages 
and underwriting other labor benefits, never again 
^^New York Times, 21 February 191?» 15 December 
1917; Cobb to Lansing, 1? April I917, 812.512/1659? 
Gerhardt, England and The Mexican Revolution 1910-1920, 
p. M-99; and Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry 
1890-1950, pp. 120-122. 
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reaped the huge profits he enjoyed during the Porfiriato. 
With the promulgation of the Constitution of 191?» the 
foreigner's "heyday" came to an end. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
/ 
When Porfirio Diaz sent out the call for foreign 
capital, Mexico became flooded with investors, eager to 
/ 
take advantage of Diaz* generous concessions. While 
/ 
the foreigner and the Diaz administration grew wealthy 
as Mexico's economy flourished, the Mexican masses still 
/ 
floundered in poverty. Small wonder that as the Diaz 
administration pampered and protected the foreigner, yet 
repressed the masses, anti-foreign hatred grew to enormous 
proportions in Mexico. When the Diaz regime fell in 1910, 
this bitter hatred burst forth in brutal fashion from all 
quarters of Mexico. 
In many ways, those foreigners who remained in 
Mexico during the Revolution contributed something to 
its continuance. Robbed constantly by all sides, the 
only lucky foreigner was the one who did not meet death. 
Rebels, such as Pancho Villa, felt that the foreigners* 
wealth came from the people so when the people needed 
that wealth, they should be able to take it back. This 
type of attitude must have influenced Woodrow Wilson who 
looked upon Villa as being similar to Robin Hood, who 
115 
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also robbed the rich to pay the poor.^ 
Revolutionaries robbed and plundered at will 
during the Revolution in order to maintain their struggle. 
Nothing seemed to be too large or useless to steal. Any­
one's livestock, clothing, blankets, arms or money 
became fair game to the rebels. Foreigners, especially 
those with some wealth, were favorite targets for the 
rebels who kidnapped them for ransom. 
Mines, ranches, and railroads in the unprotected 
rural areas became easy prey for the roaming bands of 
rebels and bandits. Although the rural areas had their 
problems, the vicious brutality of the Revolution was 
best exemplified in the cities. 
City residents suffered unbelievable depredations 
as the cities, taken by one group and then retaken by 
another, wallowed in a state of continuous chaos. Food 
always remained in short supply and the money available 
to buy that food, often became of no value as contend­
ing forces refused to accept the opposition's currency.^ 
Foreign merchants, consistantly blamed for high food 
prices, faced the vengeance of hungry mobs, often 
^Guzman, Memoirs of Pancho Villa, p. 4-63; Ger­
hardt, England and The Mexican Revolution 1910-1920, 
p. 320. 
2 / 
Jamieson, Tulitas of Torreon, p. 13^; Gerhardt, 
England and The Mexican Revolution 1910-1920, p. 120. 
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aroused to a frenzy by the presence of American troops 
on Mexican soil, or by blatant anti-foreign editorials 
in the Mexican press. 
The cities also witnessed the most devastating 
destruction of foreign property and lives. Bloody 
massacres of Chinese and Spanish merchants lent an air 
of horror to the long and bitter struggle. Bodies, 
sometimes horribly mangled from torture tactics, lined 
the streets of Torreon and Parral on more than one 
occasion. Pestilence, death and disease walked the 
streets of every Mexican city and town during the tur­
moil. 
The fury of the Revolution devastated Mexico, 
but out of the ruins emerged a sense of Mexican Nation­
alism so intense that a new nation arose, a nation of 
Mexicans. The foreigner, for so long a dominating 
factor in Mexico, would never become a singularly dom­
inant factor again. 
The plight of the foreigner can best be summed 
/ 
up by the use of some revealing statistics. When Diaz 
left office approximately 31,70? Americans lived in 
Mexico and by September, 1919* this figure had decreased 
to just 8,882. It was estimated that 3^5 American 
civilians lost their lives during the Revolution, yet 
if one includes the scores of other foreigners and 
American military men who also died, and takes into 
118 
account the fact that American property losses alone 
totaled over $500,000,000, the impact that the Revo­
lution had on foreigners becomes quite significant.3 
Many of the foreign fatalities occurred in Chihuahua and 
Coahuila because in these two states the struggle began 
and continuously intensified through the years. 
Perhaps the only consolation that the harassed 
foreigner might have received from his suffering during 
the Revolution was the fact that Pancho Villa, perhaps 
the cruelest rebel of all, had faced similar troubles. 
For, when Villa retired to his estate at Canutillo, 
Durango, he appealed to President Obregon to protect 
him from marauding bandits who had robbed him of 200 
head of horses.^ Perhaps this was a fitting reward to 
one of the greatest bandits of them all. 
^Fall Committee Report, It863-865; 2:3399* 
h. 
New York Times, 19 December 1920. 
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